Exporting American Exceptionalism

A Comparative Study of U.S. and U.K.

International Food Aid

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Abstract

U.S. law requires foreign aid to be purchased in the U.S. and shipped to recipients (the tied aid model). All other major donors have untied their aid, permitting them to purchase food donations in the recipient country or a neighboring country (5, 16, 22, 43). I employed a comparative case study between the U.S. and U.K. to investigate why the U.S. has maintained a tied aid model, while another major donor, like the U.K., switched to an untied model. I analyzed U.S. and U.K. primary sources on food aid to identify historical, political, and institutional factors that contributed to the U.S. and U.K.’s differing aid policies. I found that the U.S. lacked the focusing events needed to change the U.S.’s self-interested policy path, the U.S. presidential system’s incremental nature made passing reforms more difficult in the U.S., and the balance of interest groups and more effective strategic framing by the opposition made the public less receptive to switching models. Surprisingly, in practice, both countries still used a tied aid model, awarding about 90% of their aid contracts to their own companies (90, 94). The lack of change in the U.K. procurement system raises questions about why U.K. policy outlines one aid model, even though they use an alternate model in practice.
Introduction

Hunger kills 21,000 people per day, about 1 person every 4 seconds (46, 87, 157). In developing countries, 791 million people suffered from chronic hunger in 2013 (46, 156). Food aid programs attempt to assist the millions of people that are at risk because of severe hunger. The United States spends $1.6 billion per year on delivering food aid and reaches at least 21.6 million people (5). Yet the U.S. may not be delivering food aid as efficiently as the rest of the world. By untying their aid, the U.S. could provide aid to 16.2 million more people and cut costs by $1 billion a year (5). These savings could increase the U.S. food aid program in order to help even more of the 791 million people who desperately need food (5).

Twenty-one of the world’s twenty-two major donor countries have partially or completely untied their aid systems, shifting to local and regional procurement models (LRP) (22, 79). In LRP systems donor countries purchase their food donations in the recipient country (the developing country receiving aid) or a neighboring country (3).¹ The United Kingdom was the first donor to legally untie their aid in 2002, which established them as a leader in the field for applying cutting edge food aid techniques and putting recipient benefits at the center of their aid model (75, 81, 94). They have used this position to pressure other countries to untie their aid (96). Donors like Canada, Ireland, the Netherlands, Germany and Norway followed the U.K.’s lead and untied their aid systems (6, 92). However, in reality, 80-90% of U.K. contracts are still awarded to British companies, so they still use a tied model, despite the shift in their aid policy.

The U.S. is the noted exception. U.S. law requires that most of their aid be delivered through a tied aid model, so 95% of U.S. aid is delivered through the tied-aid model. In a tied-aid system, food is purchased in the donor country and then shipped to the recipient country

¹ See Appendix A for term definitions
Between 2003 and 2012 U.S. tied aid took 4 months longer to reach recipients than untied aid and cost the U.S. an extra $9 billion, on average (29). By adhering to the status quo delivery system, the U.S. is incurring billions of dollars in costs, increasing delivery times, and decreasing the effectiveness of aid.

Given that the U.S. delivers at least 50% of the world’s food aid, it is important to understand what has prevented the government from switching its aid delivery model (16). In order to gain a more complete understanding of what has prevented the U.S. from procuring aid locally, I used a qualitative research approach that compared the U.S.’s food aid policy development with that of the U.K. Previous research investigated the general differences between the U.K. and U.S. systems of government and the differences between the LRP and tied aid models, but no literature has compared the U.S. and U.K. aid models. Specifically I ask: why has the U.S. maintained a tied-aid delivery system while other donors, like the United Kingdom, have modernized their aid delivery policy to include local and regional procurement? The U.K. provides an interesting comparison to the U.S. because these countries have similar economies, cultures, histories and ties to recipient countries, but the U.K. has legally untied its aid policy (36).

**Literature Review**

**Why Donors Deliver Food Aid: Self-Interest vs. Recipient Need**

Food aid provision is guided by the donor self-interest model, which assumes that the main purpose of providing aid is to give donors a foothold in the environments of recipient country to pursue the donors’ economic and political goals (23). Donors can also base food aid provision on a recipient need model, which allocates aid where it will produce the most benefit
for recipient countries. However, donor countries primarily provide aid through the self-interest model (23). U.S. aid policy has been shown to follow the self-interested model: their aid allocation is strongly correlated with security interests and the interests of commodity producers (9, 15, 92). In 1995, the director of U.S. aid testified that 84 cents of every dollar of aid goes back into the US economy (92). Therefore, when donors, specifically the U.S., decide how they will deliver aid, they will select a system that provides the most benefit to their own country and can be used to further their political and economic goals.

**How Aid is Delivered: Tied-Aid vs. Local and Regional Procurement (LRP)**

Donors have traditionally used a tied aid model, where aid is purchased in the donor country and shipped to recipients. Aid has always been framed as a humanitarian endeavor, but it also delivers significant benefits to the countries donating aid. The traditional tied aid system has reduced malnutrition and improved access to food (8). However, donors have also used the system to get rid of their agriculture surpluses and expand into recipient markets (84, 115-117, 120, 127, 132). By establishing a foothold in the recipient country, donors have more leverage to pursue political goals and increase economic exports (13). For example, aid is often used to reward allies and penalize opposing countries during war (especially during the Cold War). Tied aid also creates jobs and boosts the economy of the donor country since aid is purchased within the country, benefiting the donor’s agricultural sector, and is often shipped by the donor country’s ships, benefiting the donor’s maritime industry (23). Donors often argue that these economic benefits help maintain public support for foreign aid programs (82, 86, 90).

However, tied-aid is faulted for creating unintended adverse effects like production and labor disincentives (2). Opponents claim that tied aid compromises indigenous self-reliance and undermines incentives for the government to invest in domestic structures since international
donors are providing the rural support and emergency aid needed to overcome the crisis (21, 38). Recently, many donors have switched to a local and regional procurement system, purchasing aid in the recipient country then coordinating its delivery (5). Most research (e.g., 16, 22, 43) reveals significant cost and time savings with LRP. Proponents also advocate for LRP because it minimally disrupts the local market, circumvents market impediments, and provides an outlet for market surplus by purchasing the aid locally (21, 38). Local procurement also builds recipient markets by investing in the businesses of members in the affected community and offers aid that is more culturally appropriate since it is purchased from the same region that recipients usually acquire their food from (2, 5, 22). However, opponents point out that LRP involves new risks like traders defaulting on orders, lower quality food (since it is purchased abroad, outside of the U.S.’s strict quality control guidelines), and aid demand causing market instability (5).

**Cost and Time Differences Between LRP Delivery and Tied Aid Delivery**

Many research studies found that local and regional procurement was a faster system than tied-aid delivery and costs 40% less on average (22, 43). LRP was 14 weeks faster on average when a study compared U.S.’s tied aid delivery to local procurement aid donated from the same source, to the same destination and in the same time period (22). The greatest time advantages were observed for land-locked countries and countries far from the U.S. (22). For Sub-Saharan African countries local purchases took an average of 112 days less than U.S. deliveries and cost 34% less (5, 43). Specifically LRP was 54% less for Uganda, 55% less for Zambia, and 77% less for Kenya (5, 43). Untying aid would also require eliminating the Agricultural Cargo Preference (ACP), which requires that the U.S. deliver at least 75% of aid on
American flagships (3). In 2006, ACP drove shipping prices up 46% and cost the U.S. an additional $104 million (22).

However, some researchers challenge the validity of LRP cost and time savings. Deliveries to Latin America and deliveries of processed commodities like vegetable oil can be more expensive using the LRP model (22, 43). Plus, LRP information is from the World for Peace Programme’s local purchases, but they pay lower prices because they purchase so much food, so often, and have many regional offices to oversee the process. Similarly, tied-aid information comes from the U.S., but their prices are inflated because of ACP (22). Despite these questions, the majority of donor countries have untied their aid systems. The U.S. is the noted exception (16).

**The Growing Use of Local and Regional Procurement Except By The U.S.**

In 1996, the European Commission published a report on the efficiency savings of the LRP model (22). In response, donors like the UN, Canada and the U.K. shifted their aid models to incorporate more LRP (6, 8). Climbing food and fuel prices, increased focus on emergency situations, and decreases in agricultural surpluses added to the LRP model’s appeal (13, 16). But, the U.S. aid system remains unchanged from its original structure. 95% of U.S. aid is tied and the system still contains the Agricultural Cargo Preference, requiring that at least 75% of U.S. aid be delivered using American flagships (3). Recently, politicians have proposed switching aid models to take advantage of the cost savings and Congress has had more and more hearings to discuss the LRP model (13).

**U.S. Institutional Factors: Separation of Powers and Political Gridlock**

One possible explanation for the differences in the U.K. and U.S procurement models is the institutional differences between the two government systems. In the presidential system
voters directly elect the President (28, 35). The clear division between the legislature and the executive in the presidential system leads to personality-based platforms and a “winner-takes-all” mentality for the executive position, which allows inexperienced outsiders and presidents with minority support to gain the position, weakening the executive’s ability to achieve compromise (19, 108). The President often does not have a majority in the legislature, which can create additional political gridlock. Compromises are also harder to pass into law because the presidential system involves numerous checks and balances and, so policy change is more incremental, and once something is passed, it becomes extremely difficult to remove, so politicians have strong incentive to block change (19, 108).

On the other hand, in the parliamentary system, the majority party in the legislature selects the Prime Minister, and Prime Ministers only remain in power as long as their party maintains the majority in Parliament. Therefore, the party and the executive are actively engaged with each other throughout every strategic political decision (35). For this reason, the executive is actually a collective body run by the Prime Minister, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Chancellor of the Treasury, and the Cabinet Office, a number of who will be from the Prime Minister’s own party (28, 109). Therefore, the majority party attempts to push through as much of its agenda as possible, but these changes are often reversed when a new party gains the majority (19, 35, 42). Political scientists characterize this model of policy change as “stop and go” policy (19, 35).

**U.S. Institutional Factors: The Role of Interest Groups**

The parliamentary and presidential systems create different roles for interest groups. In the parliamentary system, politicians work their way up through the party and the party runs and finances candidates’ campaigns (19, 35). British citizens consider candidates a representation of
the party, so they usually vote based on party rather than the individual candidate (19, 35). This insulates politicians from interest groups when they are running for office, and, once politicians are in Parliament, the efficiency of the parliamentary system leaves little time for interest groups to express opposing viewpoints (19, 35).

In contrast, U.S. Congressmen are very vulnerable to the power of interest groups. In the U.S. system, candidates run their own individual campaigns, and the party does not play as active a role in the career path of a politician (26, 19, 108). Therefore campaigns are focused on and financed by the candidate, so they require the support of interest groups to gain the financial and constituent support they require (26, 1997, 19, 108). In addition, policy changes must navigate numerous checks and balances before they become law, so interest groups have sufficient time to express their opinions on issues that politicians are debating and pressure them to enact or prevent change (26, 19, 108). Preventing change is often the easier path since changes can be stalled or shut down at the many decision points that changes must pass through to become law. The differences between the two systems could explain the U.K. and the U.S.’s aid models. The political environments created within these systems could also impact the U.S. and U.K.’s divergent policy paths.

**U.S. Political Factors: Party Differences and the Power of Interest Groups**

The political environment surrounding the food aid debate in the U.S. could be reinforcing the status quo. The power balance of interest groups could advantage opposition groups working to block change. The U.S. has a strong alliance of opposition groups called the “Iron Triangle,” which includes food producers, the shipping lobby, and an alliance of non-government organizations and government contractors (9, 20, 29). The opposition’s strategic framing of food aid could also be more compelling to the public. Proponents of change have an
additional disadvantage because the policy’s stakeholders, aid recipients, are located in developing countries, without any formal voice in U.S. system (13). The combination of a powerful opposition coalition and proponent challenges could explain the U.S.’s adherence to the tied aid model.

**A New Contribution: A Comparison between the U.S. and the U.K.**

Extensive research has been devoted to the changing food aid landscape (2, 5, 15-16, 18, 21, 25). The U.S. is continually noted as the exception to the shifting aid delivery mechanisms that many other donors employ. In response, researchers started to analyze the different factors (historical, political, and institutional) that might explain the U.S.’s adherence to the status quo, but research has not determined how these variables differ in the U.S., where the tied-aid model is used, compared to a donor that has switched models, like the U.K. I investigated the U.S.’s maintenance of the status quo by employing a comparative case study approach that juxtaposed the development of the U.S. and U.K. food aid systems. By identifying the differentiating factors between the two countries, I was able to hypothesize which factors are the most important in maintaining the status quo in the U.S.

**Hypotheses**

I posit that the different political, historical, and institutional contexts within the U.S. and the U.K. explain why the U.S. maintains a tied-aid delivery system, while the U.K. modernized with an LRP delivery system. Below are the specific hypotheses I predicted for each category of variables. If I found that the U.S.’s historical trajectory developed a more self-interested food aid policy, its institutional processes for change were more difficult, and its political actors opposing food aid reforms were stronger, I would consider my hypotheses
correct. It is important to note that I chose a set of variables to focus on within the policy environment, so these hypotheses could hold true even if the variables I focus on do not appear to yield a difference between the U.S. and U.K. Similarly, if my variables do appear to indicate the importance of certain factors, there could be alternative explanations for the differences observed.

**Hypothesis 1:** The U.S. federalist system requires more institutional processes to implement change than the U.K. parliamentary system, so the incremental nature and checks and balances of the U.S. system have reinforced the tied aid status quo.

**Hypothesis 2:** The U.S. has stronger political opponents and weaker political supporters than the U.K., so political supporters in the U.S. have not been able to negotiate changes to the tied aid status quo.\(^3\)

**Hypothesis 3:** The historical trajectory of U.S. food aid policy has led to a more self-interested model of food aid in the U.S. than in the U.K., which has caused the U.S. to stick with the tied-aid delivery system (since it provides more benefits to the donor country).

**Road Map**

My analyses will examine how historical, institutional, and political factors shape food aid policy in the U.S. and U.K. and how they influence attempts to change it. I will compare the development of food aid policy in the two countries, in order to determine which variables have been the most influential in reinforcing the status quo in the U.S. To provide context to the discussion of food aid, I have highlighted how the delivery model has shifted, with the

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2 See Appendix B for a more detailed account of the implications I could see if each hypothesis were correct.
3 In terms of political actors I will focus on parties, interest groups, lobbies and institutions. This analysis focuses on elite political groups instead of mass public opinion. Further research could
exception of the U.S.’s model. Next, I will compare the U.S.’s food aid policy development to that of the U.K.’s, to determine which historical, political, and institutional factors surrounding proposed changes, centering on President Obama’s proposed reforms in the FY2014 Budget, have had the largest impact on the U.S.’s maintenance of the tied-aid system.

**Limitations of My Analyses**

I selected a limited number of variables and documents to investigate, which could be affecting my conclusions. I based my choice off of the variables that other food aid researchers have identified as impactful in the development of food aid policy. I may have neglected variables that are important factors in facilitating or preventing change. Further research is needed to explore other variables in food aid policy, that impact change.

I also based the importance of the factors I did select on a comparison between the U.S. and the U.K. I selected the U.K. as a comparative study because it has a similar history and culture to the U.S., but it has untied all of its aid. However, there are cultural differences between American and British people that could be extraneously impacting their acceptance or rejection of food aid reforms. Since this is a case study comparing two real and complex countries, there is no way to neutralize all the confounding variables. However, it is worth pursuing further case studies comparing aid policies in order to create a stronger correlation between certain historical, institutional and political factors and policy change. This would enable us to exclude qualities that are unique to a specific country and not an essential piece of the environment for change.

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be conducted on the influence of mass public opinion on food aid policy, since there is limited
Data and Methods

Case Selection

I chose a comparative study between the U.K. and the U.S. because they are the world’s top two aid donors, but the U.K.’s policy outlines an untied aid system while the U.S.’s policy requires a tied aid system. Both countries are global powers and they share similar cultures and economies since the U.S. was one of the U.K.’s colonies. The U.K.’s food aid policy was also created specifically to develop its colonies, so the U.K.’s aid policy began for self-interested motives. Given that many researchers (e.g. 9, 15) cited the U.S.’s tradition of donor self-interest as a possible explanation for the U.S.’s dependence on the tied aid model the U.K. policy’s similarly self-interested roots provided a useful comparison. However, there was a discrepancy between the two cases since the U.S. is a larger donor of food aid than any other country in the world, providing around half of all of the world’s food aid (16). The U.K. is the second largest donor in the world, but in 2014 there was a $13.34 billion difference between aid contributions (U.S.: $32.73 billion and U.K.: $19.39 billion) (95).

The figure below shows the U.S. and U.K.’s aid amounts alongside three other major donors: Germany, The Netherlands, and Canada and demonstrates the discrepancy between the U.S. and the rest of the world’s donors. The other three major donors all provided under $11B of aid, less than a third of what the U.S. provided (95). The figure also highlights that the U.S. is the only donor that legally ties their aid. Aid from the U.K., Germany, Canada, or the Netherlands does not have to be purchased within their countries.

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4 Donor self-interest refers to selecting policies that deliver the most benefit to the donor country’s stakeholders over the needs of recipients.
Table 1: 

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Amount ($)</th>
<th>% Tied</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>$32.7 B</td>
<td>95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.K.</td>
<td>$19.4 B</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>$10.4 B</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Netherlands</td>
<td>$5.5 B</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>$3.9 B</td>
<td>0%</td>
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Although there is a discrepancy between the U.K. and U.S.’s aid amounts, the figure demonstrates that the U.K. provides the closest comparison to the U.S. and a useful case study to investigate differing aid models, since 95% of U.S. aid is delivered through tied aid while, legally, the U.K.’s system is untied.

Data

I focused on a period from 1929 through the present since the U.K.’s first food aid act was passed in 1929 (49). The U.S.’s food aid policy started a few years later in 1954 (115-117, 120). I began comparing the U.K. and U.S.’s food aid policy by analyzing government

5 See in Appendix: Table 1
6 (95)
documents like legislation that established the countries’ respective food aid policies, amendments, legislative debates, and floor summaries. I accessed U.K. and U.S. government documents through their databases: ProQuest Congressional [and Executive Branch publications], U.S. Congressional Serial Set 1817-1994, CQ Press Electronic Library, House of Commons Parliamentary Papers, UK Parliament Guides, and Legislation.gov.uk. I used these sources to identify critical junctures where either country’s aid policy could have changed paths, the key arguments in the food aid debate, and the institutional processes reforms went through.\(^8\)

For more external perspectives, I turned to organizations’ reports and newspapers. Examples of organization reports I used are USAID’s annual performance and budget reports, OECD’s food aid reports and the Government Accountability Office’s aid effectiveness reports. Newspaper articles, politician statements and speeches, and interest group statements were used to analyze each country’s food aid dialogue, cite key developments, and highlight arguments on either side of the debate. For newspaper articles, I focused on prominent and mainstream newspapers like the U.S.’s New York Times and the U.K.’s Guardian.

Methods

I took a qualitative research approach that drew on primary and secondary sources to answer why the United States’ food aid policy has not changed from a tied to an untied aid model, while food aid policy in countries like the U.K. have changed to untied aid. Initially, I accessed each category of factors independently (historical, political, and institutional). I based my initial codes off of factors that the literature identified as important to food aid policy

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\(^7\) Tied refers to the amount of aid that is legally required to be tied in each country. 

\(^8\) Statements will come from political figures like President Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair, who were both involved in attempts to reform the aid policies in their respective countries, rank-and-file legislators active on the issue, and other organizations that are identified as major players.
development. As I coded, I added factors that appeared frequently in the documents, returning to previous documents to apply these new codes to documents that I had previously analyzed. Then, I synthesized these approaches to form a complete narrative of the most important features in each country’s food aid policy and the major differences that have led to opposite food aid delivery approaches. However, I only considered a subset of policy variables, so alternative explanations are possible for each finding. To counteract this limitation, I focused on a robustness of evidence within each category of variables, only considering factors important if they could be triangulated, meaning that a number of different sources referenced them.

My historical analyses centered on critical junctures, an analytical policy tool developed by Kilby and Fleck, which centered on key moments in policy development. I identified critical junctures by noting moments where primary sources referenced events or government processes that had the potential to change the food aid policy path. They could be moments created by global events, external to the country’s government, or proposals for change occurring within the governmental process. I selected the most important junctures from all of the policy decisions using triangulation to insure that critical junctures were decisions that multiple documents referenced. I traced how these critical junctures determined policy paths, which have led to the U.S. and U.K.’s current food aid policies. The concept behind this model is grounded in the idea of policy feedback, which emphasizes how previous legislation, political discussions, and events shape the current political environment.

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9 See Appendix Table 2 for complete list of codes
The Subset of Codes: Critical Junctures, Incrementalism, and Framing

In analyzing historical factors, I focused exclusively on identifying the critical junctures and the resulting path dependencies for food aid policy in each country. As mentioned above, these factors are based on Kilby and Fleck’s model (20). Next I analyzed institutional variables: I coded for how policy developed (incrementally or “stop and go”), the balance of interest group power, where aid was delivered and how it was delivered. Politically, I examined proponents and opposition groups’ strategic framing of reforms; for example humanitarian frames, self-interested frames, efficiency frames, and the “tried and true” frame are all different ways of framing food aid reforms to support opponents’ or proponents’ arguments. I examined the variables to understand which combination of historical, political, and institutional factors have prevented or enabled change in both countries. By comparing the findings from each country, I gained a more complete understanding of which factors have been the most important in the evolution of food aid policy in the U.S. and the U.K.

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10 The critical juncture and path dependency model is based on the idea of political feedback, and states that events and policy decisions push policy down a certain path that it is too costly to turn back from (see Hacker 1998 for more information).
### Results

#### U.S. Results: Table 3

| Historical                  | Cold War and economic tool  |
|                            | War on Terror               |
|                            | Failed Reforms              |
|                            | Reinforces self-interested path |

| Institutional               | Incremental policy makes change difficult |
|                            | Political negotiations important |
|                            | Vulnerable to interest groups |
|                            | Supporters $<$ Opposition |
|                            | **95% tied contracts**       |

| Political                   | Increased efficiency        |
|                            | Reach more people           |
|                            | Recipient benefits          |
|                            | Concessions to opposition   |
|                            | Loss of jobs                |
|                            | New Risks vs. “Tried and True” |

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11 See Appendix: Table 2 for complete list of codes
### U.K. Results: Table 4\(^{13}\)

<table>
<thead>
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<tr>
<td>• Pergau Dam Scandal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• New Labour Party</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Shifted to recipient-focused policy</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institutional</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• “Stop and Go” policy allows change</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Public opinion important</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Insulated from interest groups</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Supporters &gt; Opposition</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• <strong>90% tied contracts</strong></td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Political</th>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Efficiency</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Moral purpose</td>
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<td>• Long-term benefits</td>
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<tr>
<td>• International leadership</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Loss of jobs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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</table>

**Results Summary: Change in Policy but Not in Practice**

Table 3 and Table 4 summarize my major findings for each country (Table 3 is my results for the U.S. and Table 4 is my results for the U.K.). I found that a combination of historical, institutional, and political factors strongly influenced the U.K.’s shift in aid policy, but, in practice, 80-90% of U.K. aid contracts were still awarded to U.K. companies, which is

\(^{12}\) See in Appendix: Table 3
similar to the U.S.’s award of 95% of aid contracts to American companies (90, 94, 106, 120, 147). The high percentage of U.K. contracts that remain within the country indicate that the U.K. still uses a tied aid model, even after eliminating the legal requirements for the tied system.

However, the U.K. was able to change the requirements of their aid policy, so they now have the ability to shift towards an untied aid model. The U.K.’s aid policy was self-interested, but the combination of the Pergau Dam aid scandal, where the courts ruled that the aid project was illegal since the funds were linked to an arms deal between the U.K. and Malaysia, and the formation of the New Labour party created a critical juncture that allowed the U.K. to shift its policy (86, 105). Since the Prime Minister always has a majority in Parliament, food aid reforms could pass quickly through the legislature (86). Proponents primarily framed the switch as a return to the moral purpose of aid while citing the long term economic benefits the U.K. would enjoy if recipient markets developed. An overwhelming majority of interest groups supported this frame. However, interest groups were less important to politicians due to the protection parties provide to Parliamentary members in the U.K. system (86). On the other hand, public opinion was extremely important.

Historical, political, and institutional factors combined to prevent policy change in the U.S. Traditionally, the U.S.’s policy was self-interested, used as political and economic tool during the Cold War and then the War on Terror. The U.S. had multiple critical junctures where policy could have become more recipient-focused, including reform proposals from Congressmen and presidents, but they did not pass, which reinforced the U.S.’s self-interested aid policy (115-117, 127-128, 140-141, 143-146, 149-150, 156, 162-164, 181). A united

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\(^{13}\) See in Appendix: Table 4
coalition of opposition interest groups influenced this outcome by pressuring Congress to stall changes (143, 147). They also effectively mobilized the public by linking aid reforms with the loss of American jobs and highlighting the risks in switching to a new, untested aid model (143, 147, 155). Proponents struggled to find a competing frame because they had differing agendas and their frames focused on recipient benefits instead of donor benefits (117, 120, 130, 162, 164). This interest group balance is extremely important because the American presidential system leaves politicians very vulnerable to interest groups (147). The system’s checks and balances also give opponents many opportunities to stall change and force supporters to continually compromise to pass change, leading to incremental reforms instead of sweeping change (147-148).

The U.S. and U.K.’s policy differences impacted the countries’ aid recipients, but, surprisingly, have not impacted the aid procurement models they use. The U.K.’s policy shift did not lead to more local and regional procurement, since the U.K. still awarded over 80% of its aid contracts to British companies (90, 106). The U.K.’s continued use of the tied aid model could be due to unintended barriers that prevent local companies from hearing about, applying for, and winning U.K. contracts (47, 58, 106). Alternatively, the U.K. could have strategically shifted its policy to gain power in international aid discussions, while still enjoying the self-interested political and economic benefits that the tied aid system provides to donor countries (102, 106). However, the countries that the U.S. and the U.K. delivered aid to did reflect the differences in their aid policies: the U.K. provided more aid to low-income countries and the U.S. donated more aid to middle income countries (86).
The Colonial Development Act of 1929 was the U.K.’s first aid policy (49, 86). Politicians implemented it to increase the U.K.’s economic strength by developing the colonies: “The Treasury…may make advances to the Government of any colony or any territory to which this section applies, for the purpose of aiding and developing agriculture and industry in the colony or territory and thereby promoting commerce with or industry in the United Kingdom” (47, 49). The government justified the foreign aid through the economic benefits the U.K. would gain if the colonies grew (47, 86). The creation of the Aid and Trade Provision in 1977 reinforced the U.K.’s self-interested foreign aid policy (47, 86). The provision required that recipients use aid money to procure British goods (86). Politicians highlighted that the program’s created U.K. jobs, increased demand for British products, and increased the U.K.’s presence in growing international markets (47, 86). They also mentioned aid’s ability to establish relationships to pursue foreign policy goals (47, 86). These self-interested purposes remained the focus of the U.K. aid program until the 1990s (47, 86, 90).

But, in 1994, U.K. policy reached a critical juncture. The court declared the Pergau Dam project illegal for the misuse of aid funds, making food aid reform a prominent political issue (86, 100, 105). The court found that aid money for the construction of the Pergau Dam in Malaysia was part of an arms deal between Malaysia and the U.K., violating U.K. law: “In that [the Pergau Dam] case, a court determined that as a matter of law, aid had to be shown to be provided for the purpose of promoting the development or maintaining the economy of a country…or the welfare of its people” (86, 100, 105). The incident became a symbol to the British people of the corruption of foreign and patronage politics (86).
Tony Brown used this focusing event to advocate for the New Labour Party’s position on aid:

“Labour believes that we have a clear moral responsibility to help combat global poverty. In government we will strengthen and restructure the British aid programme and bring development issues back into the mainstream of government decision-making…We will shift aid resources towards programmes that help the poorest people in the poorest countries…We will consider how this can be done most effectively and will ensure that the cost is met from savings elsewhere” (80, 86,103).

He advocated untying aid to increase aid’s focus on poverty alleviation and intended to make providing aid based on commercial interests illegal (56, 58, 70, 74, 77-78, 80-81, 86, 103,107). Since the parliamentary system has a “stop and go” model of policy change, when Tony Blair and the New Labour Party were elected in 1997, they were able to push their foreign aid stance through Parliament quickly, with little opposition within Parliament (19, 35, 50, 52, 70, 80, 86, 89). The New Labour Party created the Department for International Development and issued two Government White Papers, outlining the government’s development agenda (51, 56, 68, 70, 86, 89). In 2002, New Labour’s position officially became law through International Development Act (70, 80, 86). The law established that the purpose of providing aid was to alleviate poverty, and made aid linked to British commercial interests illegal, which created a new, recipient-focused path dependency for the British aid policy (51 56, 61, 68, 70 80, 78, 74, 86, 89).

New Labour framed untying aid as a return to the moral purpose of aid and emphasized the efficiency of an untied system (47-48, 56, 59, 61, 65-67, 68, 73, 75-76, 78, 80-81, 84-86, 91, 97, 99, 107). Untying aid was considered moral since it shifted to a model that focused on
recipient needs at the expense of tied aid’s donor benefits (47, 52, 62, 65, 78, 80, 82, 85-86). The New Labour party also cited research studies that concluded that untying aid decreased delivery times and costs (48, 62, 65, 78, 86, 107). This justification represented a self-interested strategic frame since it meant that the U.K. would get more value out of its aid dollars (76, 79, 81). The efficiency savings also fit with New Labour’s humanitarian aid policy since recipients could receive more aid, faster than before (80, 86, 103). The New Labour party reinforced these arguments with a long-term economic framing of reforms: Given today’s interdependent world, if developing countries’ markets grow then the U.K.’s economy would also grow (52-53, 56, 61, 74, 76, 78, 80-82, 86, 89).

The New Labour Party focused their political efforts on generating public support for their new aid position (50, 63, 68, 89). Clare Short, the U.K.’s Secretary of State for International Development at the time, specifically stated how important public opinion was in the aftermath of the Pergau Dam scandal: “We need the public with us if we can make the kind of progress we need to make… scandals in the sense of propping up corrupt governments, undermine the confidence that public opinion has that development is possible” (68 (2), 86). Public opinion was an especially salient issue for New Labour politicians at the time, since they needed to maintain support for their rebranded party (86). The New Labour Party focused on building the public’s trust in the new aid system by creating an educational campaign to inform people about the U.K.’s current projects (50, 86).

A united coalition of interest groups supported Tony Blair’s new stance on foreign aid (53, 58, 64, 84). ActionAid Alliance, a network of development NGOs, was one of the most powerful supporters (63-64, 68, 82, 84). It includes organizations like the Working Party on Aid, BOND for international development and the Independent Group on British Aid (63, 82,
They published multiple research papers (82-89, 93-94) urging the U.K. to untie their aid, and, when the foreign aid white papers announced the government’s plan to untie aid, ActionAid and thirty-one other NGOs submitted memorandum to Parliament supporting the act: “ODI [Overseas Development Institute] is delighted to see the back of the aid and trade provision, which has been a major source of distortion and inefficiency in the programme” (63, 68 (67), 82, 86). All but two of the memorandum responses to the bill included similar feedback on the bill (68). This balance of interest group power, strong supporters versus weak opposition, made the response overwhelmingly positive.

The Confederation of British Industry and the Export Group for the Constructional Industries were the only two organizations that submitted feedback opposing the reforms. The Confederation of British Industry submitted the following statement:

“Since 1978, many of these projects have been supported by the Aid and Trade Provision (ATP), which has enabled Britain to promote hundreds of sound development schemes in over 50 countries, while bringing additional work to small and medium-sized suppliers and sub-contractors throughout the UK. The Export Group is concerned that the decision to abolish ATP may in practice mean that the UK will have no means of providing competitive financing in the future for such projects, thereby abandoning the sector to foreign companies till legally enjoying tied aid support from their own Governments.

Nonetheless, the Export Group welcomes a number of conclusions of the White Paper” (68: Export Group for the Constructional Industries Response (74)).
The Export Group for the Constructional Industries offered the following:

“While regretting the demise of the Aid and Trade Provision, the CBI welcomes the maintenance of mixed credit arrangements.” (68: CBI (78))

However, their statements did not strongly denounce the changes or demand their reversal; they simply expressed their disappointment with the loss of U.K. jobs, and then quickly switched to the aspects of the White Paper they supported (68). The role of interest groups in the British parliamentary system contributed to their passive response. British politicians are insulated from interest groups by the power of their parties and, changes pass quickly, so interest groups have less time to express their viewpoints to politicians (19, 35). This allowed New Labour to restructure the entire aid system at once, without compromising with the opposing party. Clare Short exemplified this unbending attitude with her response to the opposition’s argument that aid reforms would cause the U.K. to lose jobs:

“Some of you may wonder what they mean more specifically for British firms and industries that have been major suppliers of goods and services financed through our own bilateral programme. To you, my message is that…if you are not competitive you should not get the job. Surely it is clear that of all the people who need efficiency and effectiveness the poorest people should be the first in the queue” (81 (6-7)).

Short easily shut down opposition arguments, telling them to compete or leave the market, with no hint of compromise to soften the economic loss that U.K. companies would experience (81, 107).
The implementation of food aid reforms did not change the U.K.’s procurement system, since they continued to award the majority of their contracts to British companies, but it did change where the U.K. delivered aid. More than ten years after legally untying aid, the British system still awards 80-90% of contracts to U.K. companies (47, 58, 72, 86, 91, 106). Politicians framed untying aid as a shift towards the more efficient LRP model, but the U.K. aid procurement system still operates like a tied aid model, where aid is purchased in the donor country (the U.K.) and sent to recipients. However, the U.K. does deliver different types of aid today compared to before their aid policy was united. They use cutting-edge aid delivery mechanisms like loans, grants, technical assistance, investment in countries’ social sectors, and direct government-to-government transfer of money to deliver aid (48, 52, 54-56, 63, 67, 77).

Food aid reforms also changed who the U.K. gave aid to. Poor countries became the primary recipients, instead of middle-income countries (63-65, 70, 75). About 65.6% of U.K. aid now goes to poor countries, which is an increase of over 10% in the last ten years (63-65, 75).

Today, the U.K.’s aid policy is renowned for its focus on the benefits delivered to recipients (53, 63-65, 67, 69, 71-73, 82, 86, 97, 104, 107). Untying aid is considered a major component of this image, since it allows recipients to acquire the aid they need from the most efficient source: “By disassociating aid from the award of contracts… gains to anti-poverty programmes can be as high as 25 per cent…better collaboration [is enabled] among donors…[the U.K.] maximize[s] the effectiveness of aid in diminishing poverty” (54-55, 65, 67, 76 (11), 78, 82, 97, 104, 107) Supporters reinforce the policy’s altruistic focus by highlighting other recipient benefits of the untied aid model, like its ability to build recipients’ markets and deliver food that fits with local cultural preferences (48, 63, 81-82, 97,104).
The U.K. has leveraged its reputation for recipient-focused aid to become an international leader on aid practices (52, 54, 59, 62-65, 67, 69, 75, 77-78, 81-82, 84-88, 94, 96, 98-99, 103-104, 107). They have pressured other donors to untie their aid and set the international agenda on aid priorities (52, 58-59, 62, 64-65, 69, 77-78, 81-82, 84-86, 88, 94, 96, 98-99 104). For example, they were the driving force behind the creation of the Millennium Development Goals\(^\text{14}\) in 2000 (52, 58 64-65, 67, 69,74, 77, 84-85, 98, 104). Studies since have repeatedly found that meeting these goals will require at least $25 billion more, so supporters of untied aid have started framing untying aid as essential to meeting the Millennium Development Goals (52, 64-65, 74, 98).

**The United States**

The U.S.’s Food for Peace Act has remained largely unchanged since Eisenhower signed the act in 1954 (115-117, 120, 127, 143-146, 149). The original act stated that the purpose of foreign aid was to advance American political and economic interests, including gaining a profit for agricultural surplus (84, 115-117, 120, 127, 132). Its political purpose was reinforced during the Cold War, when only “friendly nations,” (countries that were not controlled by a Communist regime) received aid. George Shultz, the U.S. Secretary of State in 1985, stated plainly that: “Our foreign assistance programs are vital to the achievement of our foreign policy goals” (84, 92 (49), 118, 120, 132,140-141). At the end of the Cold War, U.S. food aid policy reached a critical juncture where it was possible to shift to a more recipient-focused policy, but when President Bush mentioned food aid as a part of the U.S.’s strategy after 9/11, aid shifted

\(^{14}\) The Millennium Development Goals were eight goals that country leaders agreed to in 2000. They range from halving extreme poverty rates to providing universal primary education and they were supposed to be achieved by 2015
from a Cold War weapon to a weapon in the War on Terror (84, 134, 136-140). The reinstatement of aid as a political tool reinforced aid’s association with U.S. security and foreign policy interests and continued to push U.S. aid policy down a self-interested path dependency (84, 118-120, 127, 134, 136-140, 157, 170).

However, President Bush’s experiences in Afghanistan convinced him that the U.S. required more flexible aid tools, so he proposed that 25% of the food aid budget be purchased locally (115-117, 127, 133, 140-141, 143-147, 149, 160). His reforms were largely rejected, but Congress did pass his $40 million local and regional procurement pilot project (112-114, 117, 120, 122, 126-129, 143-147, 149, 152-153, 164). Congress required that the program include periodic evaluations to decide whether the model should be expanded (112-114, 117, 120, 122, 126-127, 129, 143-146, 149, 152). In the 2014 Farm Bill, Congress made the LRP pilot program a permanent part of the food aid budget, increasing its budget to $80 million to deal with international emergencies (32, 112-114, 117, 120, 122, 126-129, 143-146, 149, 152).

In 2013, President Obama proposed similar food aid reforms in his FY 2014 Budget Request (116-117, 120, 127, 140-141, 143-146, 149, 153, 156, 160). He recommended ending monetization and allowing 45% of emergency food aid to be acquired locally (120, 127, 143-146, 149, 153, 156, 181). Congressmen proposed a number of bills to enact Obama’s recommendations including the Royce-Engel Food Aid Reform Amendment, LRP Amendment to the Senate Farm Bill, and the Royce-Bass Food Aid Reform Act (115-117, 127-128, 140-141, 143-146, 149-150, 156, 162-164, 181). All of these proposed reforms created critical junctures in U.S. aid policy, where the aid procurement model could have changed, but none of these recommendations passed through Congress, which reinforced the U.S.’s self-interested path dependency (115-117, 127-128, 140-141, 143-146, 149-150, 156, 162-164, 181).
The proponents pushing these reforms onto the agenda included food aid researchers, human rights activists, and politicians from both parties (112-114, 120, 152, 159-160, 163, 168, 174, 179). A collection of NGOs called InterAction support reforms that increase the number of people receiving life-saving food assistance, including untying aid and eliminating the Cargo Preference (111, 117, 130,160, 167-168, 179). However, they oppose the elimination of monetization, which is often part of food aid reforms (117, 120, 130, 162, 164, 167-168, 179). Monetization is when NGOs sell food assistance to recipient countries’ markets in order to generate funds for their other development programs (117). They argue that NGOs require monetization to run their other programs, and the government should reduce the need to monetize by providing cash instead of making the practice illegal (117, 120, 130, 162, 164, 167-168, 179).

Supporters of food aid reform primarily frame untying aid using humanitarian and economic strategic frames. They state that reforms would allow the U.S. to reach more people, faster, and at a lower cost: “By enacting these bipartisan, common-sense food aid reforms, we can do more with less—we can feed more starving people, more quickly, at a lower cost” (112-113, 116-117, 119-120, 123-127, 140-142, 147, 150, 154-156, 159, 162-165, 168, 175-176, 179). They also employ a humanitarian strategic frame that states that the LRP model builds local communities by investing in their markets and reducing recipients’ vulnerability to future disasters (112-113, 117, 120, 123, 125, 127, 130-131, 133, 140-142, 147, 160, 162). Proponents also argue that LRP aid fits with the cultural preferences of the region where it is delivered (112-113, 120, 123, 125-126, 130-131, 127, 140-141, 175).

Reform advocates incorporated concessions to the opposition in their reforms to attempt to create a compromise (112-114, 120, 123, 125, 127, 140-142, 156, 168,). Supporters
characterize LRP as a way to modernize the aid system and increase the variety of food aid tools they have at their disposal: “Greater flexibility in our food aid system would allow the U.S. to employ the right tool at the right time when responding to crises” (112-113, 115-117 (3), 119-120, 125, 127, 130, 140-142, 156, 159-160, 162-164, 168-169, 177, 179). Both of these justifications emphasize that reforms will not replace the current system. Reform bills use this same language, stating that no matter what reforms are passed U.S. agriculture will still produce the majority of aid (120-121, 127, 140-141, 162, 168). President Obama’s most recent reforms even proposed compensating the Maritime Industry, which would lose money because of decreased shipping needs in the LRP model (120, 140-141).

Reform supporters have not been able to overcome the united coalition of interest groups that oppose reforms (115-117, 127-128, 140-141, 143-146, 149-150, 156, 162-164, 181). The agricultural lobby, commodity groups and farm groups oppose reforms because of the money they would lose if the U.S. government were to buy agricultural commodities abroad instead of domestically (110, 117, 120, 140-141, 147, 155). Many NGOs oppose reforms because they rely on monetization to fund their other humanitarian projects and food aid reforms usually propose eliminating monetization (117, 120, 130, 162, 164, 167-168, 179). These opposition groups have united as the Alliance for Global Food Security (117, 120-121, 130, 151, 157, 161-162, 164, 167-168, 179). The Alliance for Global Food Security’s inclusion of many different groups and their united purpose led to a U.S. balance of interest group power where opposition groups were stronger than proponents.

The opposition’s most common strategic frame was self-interested: untying aid would eliminate American jobs in the agricultural and shipping industries (110, 120-121, 140-142, 147, 155). Acquiring aid abroad could also decrease visibility, since the U.S. logo might not be
stamped onto the boxes and bags of aid (110, 120-121, 140-142, 147, 155). They pointed out that this would lead to the deterioration of the U.S. donor image (110, 120-121, 140-142, 155). They also framed the untied model as less transparent, meaning that the U.S. could end up buying or donating aid to its competition or purchasing lower quality aid in countries without the same stringent health requirements as the U.S. (110, 120-121, 140-142, 147, 155). The opposition also questions whether there is enough local and regional supply to satisfy the large amount of aid that the U.S. donates (110, 120-121, 140-142, 147, 155). They argue that we do not currently have the market intelligence to ensure that we do not increase demand beyond developing countries’ capacity to produce (110, 120-121, 140-142, 147, 155). In contrast they strategically frame the in-kind model as “tried and true,” citing all of the success it has had in delivering aid across the world and questioning why the government would change such a successful system (113, 120-121, 127, 130, 140-142, 151, 155, 161).

The opposition coalition used its reach and diverse contacts to exert enormous pressure on Congress to shut down reforms (121, 147, 161, 166). Days after President Obama announced his 2014 budget with proposed food aid reforms, he received a letter signed by seventy interest groups opposing the reforms and calling for the maintenance of the status quo program (158, 172-173). A similar letter was sent to the leaders of nine congressional committees in the House and Senate including the agricultural, foreign affairs, appropriations and budget committees (158, 173). They also urged their constituents to write their own representatives and senators to protest reforms (158, 173). Once interest groups made their opposition to reforms clear, politicians began blocking reforms using stall tactics (121, 147, 161). They argued that there was not enough information on the LRP model and asked for further research (112-113, 117, 120, 122, 126-129, 143-147, 149, 152-153, 164, 181). Another stall tactic was supporting
uniting aid, but limiting its use to emergency assistance (121, 128, 127, 131, 139, 147, 157, 161, 167). Since policy change is incremental and difficult to pass in the presidential system, these stall tactics were very effective in reducing the impact of reforms and maintaining tied aid’s position as the main system (19, 35).

The U.S.’s policy and aid system was largely unchanged (54). The U.S. delivers about 95% of aid through the tied system and alternative delivery mechanisms\(^\text{15}\) are hardly mentioned (94, 120, 147). The U.S.’s recipients still reflect a self-interested aid policy (47, 92, 119-120). Recipients have shifted from allies in the Cold War to allies in the War on Terror like Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Jordan. Egypt and Israel are currently the two largest recipients of U.S. aid (92, 119-120). These countries are all middle-income countries, which fits with the American purpose of pursuing economic and political interests, since these countries have more resources that the U.S. can use for its own agenda (47, 92, 119-120).

**Discussion**

**Historical Comparison**

Both the U.S. and U.K. began providing foreign aid in order to gain economic and political benefits for their own countries, but the U.K. expected economic benefits when their aid yielded results for the colony (47, 49, 84, 86, 115-117, 120, 127, 132, 139, 170). The U.S. gained benefits immediately by getting rid of its agricultural surplus (84, 115-117, 120, 127, 132). These origins impacted the development of their policies. The U.K. was able to justify reforms with the logic that the world has become interdependent, so growth in developing countries would benefit the U.K. economy in the long-term (52-53, 56, 61, 74, 76, 78, 80-82,

\(^{15}\) Other mechanisms include grants, direct budget support, social sector programs etc.
On the other hand, the U.S. discussion remains dominated by opponents’ arguments that reforms will cost the U.S. its short-term benefits including pursuing political and economic agendas and the loss of American jobs (110, 120-121, 140-142, 147, 155).

Both the U.K. and U.S.’s. foreign aid policies had self-interested path dependencies, but critical junctures shifted the U.K.’s policy path, while the U.S. continued down a self-interested policy path (47, 49, 84, 120). In the U.K., the combination of public pressure for reform after the Pergau Dam scandal and the rebranding of the Labour Party created a critical juncture that made establishing a new path dependency possible (52, 56, 86, 100, 105). Due, in part, to the features of the parliamentary system, the policy shift occurred within the New Labour Party and then altered the country’s policy path when they became the parliamentary majority (19, 35, 51, 56, 70, 86). The U.S. had critical junctures within their governmental system, in the form of proposed reforms and policy amendments that could have altered their aid path dependency like the reforms proposed by the Bush and Obama administrations and various Congressmen (110, 115-117, 120, 127-128, 140-141, 147, 162-164). However, without a public focusing event like the Pergau Dam Scandal, the U.S. has been unable to significantly alter its path dependency. Instead, Bush’s speech tying the provision of aid to the War on Terror and the opposition’s defeat of multiple reform attempts reinforced the U.S.’s self-interested path dependency, which uses aid as a political and economic tool (65, 84, 120, 147, 134).

**Institutional Comparison**

When New Labour changed the U.K.’s foreign aid policy, they redefined the purpose of providing foreign aid as poverty alleviation and made allocating aid based on U.K. commercial interests illegal (51, 53, 56, 58, 61, 68, 70, 74, 78, 80, 86, 89). With this purpose, the U.K. could justify switching to untied aid since it alleviates poverty more efficiently. The U.S.’s primary
purpose in providing aid was to pursue American economic and foreign policy benefits (82, 112-114, 117, 120, 123, 125-127, 130-131, 140-142, 147-148, 160, 175). Untying aid would allow the U.S. to provide aid more effectively to recipients, but it would decrease U.S. benefits, which does not resonate with the U.S. expectation that aid should further the U.S.’s political and economic interests (112-114, 117, 120, 123, 125-127, 130-131, 140-142, 147-148,160, 175).

The “stop and go” policy of the parliamentary system allowed the U.K. to make its policy shift faster than change could occur in the U.S.’s “incremental” presidential system (19, 35). Since Tony Blair automatically had a majority in Parliament, he passed his proposed food aid reforms into law without much political negotiation (81, 80, 86). Instead, his political efforts went towards an educational campaign to win the public’s support for U.K. food aid initiatives (56, 68, 86). In contrast, U.S. politicians rarely noted the general public’s opinion (110-132). They focused on political negotiations within the legislature since they needed to overcome multiple checks and balances within Congress to pass changes (110-132). Reform proponents tackled this challenge by emphasizing the bipartisan support behind reforms and offering concessions to the oppositions, in order to draw enough support from both sides to pass reforms (115, 117, 127, 143, 166). On the other side, the opposition used stall tactics to reduce the scope of reforms within the bill or push the item off Congress’s agenda, which were successful since the presidential system’s incremental policy change makes large-scale change difficult (121, 147, 161).

Members of Congress are more concerned with the positions of interest groups than their British counterparts, who are more insulated from interest groups’ power (86). U.S. politicians are vulnerable to the pressure exerted by interest groups because American politicians need interest groups’ money to fund their campaigns and interest group members’ approval to get
reelected (147). In the U.K. system, politicians are more insulated from the opinions of interest
groups by the strength of their parties, which run and fund politicians’ campaigns and award
them positions based on their progress through the party ranks (86). The efficiency of the
parliamentary system due to the election of the head of government from the majority party in
the legislature also leaves little time for interest groups to express their opposition before
changes are passed (86).

The institutional features of the U.S. and U.K. systems explain interest groups’ different
levels of influence, but the balance of power of interest groups in each country also impacted
their policy directions. Only two interest groups opposed untying aid in the U.K., and they
stated their complaints and then immediately stated the changes they approved of (68).
Opposition groups’ protest was weak because the reforms were already part of British law, so
opposition groups’ complaints could not create major change and there were only two groups
speaking against the changes (68). In contrast, thirty-two groups responded giving their
complete support to all of the food aid reforms, giving supporters the balance of power in the
U.K. system (58, 68). In contrast, opposition in the U.S. is made up of hundreds of interest
groups that present a united front against reforms (121, 140-141, 147, 161, 166). They circulate
the same message throughout all of their groups and take advantage of the period when bills are
under consideration in Congress to prevent change (110, 117, 120, 147, 155, 166). The
proponents of reform are not as strong because NGOs are divided on the issue of food aid
reforms (depending on the inclusion of monetization) so the proponents struggle to present one
cohesive message and food aid stakeholders are the recipients who live abroad and do not have
a formal voice in the U.S. governmental system (168, 174). Therefore, the opposition dominates
the balance of interest groups in the U.S.
Despite different official policies, neither country has actually shifted from the tied aid model. In the U.S., 95% of aid is still delivered through the tied aid system (94, 117, 147). This is not surprising since food aid policy has remained unchanged since a food aid system was established. In contrast, the U.K. untied all of its aid in 2002, but 80-90% of contracts still go to U.K. contractors (47, 58, 91, 106). One possible explanation for the lack of change is that it allows the U.K. to continue to accrue the self-interested benefits of tied aid: the U.K. maintains the same number of jobs for its own companies and the economic boost that the government delivers in a tied aid system (102, 106), while still allowing them to gain international acclaim and more power in international discussions due to the position of their aid policy. Another possible reason for the low percentage of local procurement is that there are unintended barriers to foreign suppliers when bidding on U.K. contracts (47, 58, 106). This could mean that they do not hear about the government’s bids or they do not have the capacity and qualifications for traditional British aid programs and the British government needs to consider tailoring programs to fit with the capabilities of local producers to facilitate a shift to LRP (58, 83, 90-91, 99, 106).

**Political Comparison**

Proponents of untying food aid in both countries use similar political framings to promote untying aid. The most used argument is the efficiency frame, that untying food aid would save time and money for donors (48, 53, 55-56, 58-59, 62, 65, 67, 75-79, 81-82, 84-85, 89, 91, 97, 103, 107, 112-113, 116-117, 119-120, 123-127, 140-142, 147-148, 150, 154-156, 159-160, 162-165, 168, 175-177, 179). In the U.K., supporters built on the efficiency frame by highlighting the morality of giving aid (47, 56, 62, 68, 73, 75, 78, 80-82, 85-86, 89). They reminded people that aid was about giving to those in need and untying aid would allow the government to more effectively help the people receiving aid (47, 52, 56, 61-62, 75, 78, 80-81,
85-86, 89; 78). This was a new U.K. frame for portraying foreign aid, but it fits with the humanitarian direction of New Labour’s aid policy (70, 78, 80, 86). In the U.S., the efficiency argument is powerful because it resonates with the historical framing of aid as an economic investment. The savings were especially appealing during the economic downturn (116, 118, 127, 130-131, 140-141, 163, 165, 177). In the U.S. the efficiency argument was paired with a humanitarian frame, that if the aid system were reformed, aid could reach more people (82, 112-114, 119-120, 123, 125-127, 142, 154-156, 159-160, 162-165, 168, 174, 175-177, 179). It has a similar moral aspect to the U.K. frame, but it also has a self-interested component since reaching more people is often linked to increased visibility reach for the U.S.

Proponents in the U.S. are still fighting for reforms, so they have developed additional strategic frames for untangling aid. They highlight humanitarian benefits like untied aid’s ability to help build local markets and tailor food to local cultural preferences (112, 117, 120, 123, 125, 127, 130-131, 142, 147-148, 160, 175). Although these benefits are very significant for food aid recipients, U.S. foreign aid has always been promoted based on what it delivers to the U.S., so these frames were not as persuasive to the public (84, 92, 115-117, 120, 132, 140-142, 170). Supporters also frame the inclusion of local and regional procurement as an addition to the current system in an effort to appease the opposition (112-114, 123, 131, 127, 140-142, 174, 177). They continually reassure the opposition that the status quo will remain the primary system, but argue that local and regional procurement needs to be an available option to ensure that food aid has a balanced set of tools (112-113, 115-117 (3), 119-120, 125, 127, 130, 140-142, 156, 159-160, 162-164, 168, 177, 179).

Proponents in the U.K. have already achieved success, so their additional frames reinforce their decision to untie aid. Since the U.K. is one of the few donors with a policy of
completely untied aid, they are considered leaders in employing effective aid methods and putting the needs of recipients at the center of their aid decisions (48, 53-55, 58, 62, 64-65, 67, 69, 71-73, 78, 81-82, 84, 86, 88, 94, 96-99, 103-104). They frame untying aid as too necessary to this image to change now (64-65, 67, 78, 97-98, 104). Their position as a leader has also allowed the U.K. to exert international pressure on other donors to untie their aid and meet international development goals like the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)\(^\text{16}\) (48, 52, 55, 58-59, 62, 64-67, 69, 75, 77, 81, 84-88, 94, 96, 98-99, 104). International agreements are never mentioned in the U.S. discussion of reforming aid policy, and the MDGs are specifically controversial because the U.S. is the only country that refused to sign them (110-132).

Since interest groups have more opportunities to oppose change in the U.S. system, they have publicized additional negative frames for untying aid. They continually question the capacity and capability of local and regional procurement to meet food aid demand and argue that we do not have the monitoring capability to ensure that we are not selling to or contracting our competitors (110,113-114, 130, 142, 147-148, 155). All of these frames reinforce the overarching argument that the opposition makes, which is that using a new procurement model has risks, which are unnecessary since the current model is “tried and true” and very successful (113-114, 130, 142, 155). U.K. opposition groups never had the opportunity to lodge such a wide array of arguments against untying aid since the reforms rapidly became the law.

However, the main argument against reform in both countries was the loss of jobs that LRP procurement would have in the donor country (66, 68, 84, 110, 113-114, 120, 140-141, 147-148, 155). The loss of jobs and revenue that procuring commodities abroad would cause is

\(^{16}\) The Millennium Development Goals are a UN initiative outlining global goals that donors would attempt to achieve by 2015 like eradicating extreme poverty, promoting gender equity etc.
one of the reasons that the U.S. has such a united opposition (84, 120, 147-148, 155). The monetary loss would be huge in a number of industries (agriculture, maritime and shipping, etc.), so these opposition groups consider the effort of preventing Congressional change worth the investment (110, 117, 120, 140-141, 147, 155, 166). With the historical justification of aid as a way to grow the strength of the U.S., the opposition argument that local and regional procurement would cost the U.S. jobs is very persuasive to the American people (84, 117, 120, 140-141). In the U.K., the loss of U.K. jobs and the loss of contracts for U.K. companies were the only arguments that the opposition had the opportunity to lodge (68). However, the New Labour Party immediately shut down this argument, by stating that if U.K. companies could not survive with the increased competition, then they should not be operating in the market (81, 107).

**Reinforcing Differences Lead to Divergent Paths**

The U.K. succeeded in changing their aid policy to an untied aid model because of a combination of historical, institutional, and political factors, but the U.K. still operates using the traditional tied aid system. The combination of the Pergau Dam scandal and the reconstruction of the Labour Party created a moment where untying aid could become a prominent issue (51, 56, 70, 80, 86, 100, 105). The parliamentary structure guarantees the Prime Minister a majority in Parliament, which enabled this policy change to occur rapidly once New Labour became the majority party in Parliament (19, 35). Opposing interest groups lacked the membership and influence to prevent these reforms, because of parties’ ability to insulate British politicians (19, 35).

The history of British food aid also made the British public more receptive to political frames for untying aid like long-term economic benefits and the moral rightness of giving aid
NGOs united behind these frames and the reforms they supported (53). There was also overwhelming public support from constituents because of the Pergau Dam scandal and New Labour’s educational campaign on foreign aid programs (49, 86). The continued support of these actors has allowed the change to remain in place, contrary to the traditional conception of U.K. policy as “Stop and Go.”

U.S. food aid is still delivered through an in-kind system because of its own historical institutional, and political factors, which have created a policy environment tied to the status quo. U.S. food aid policy began as a way to pursue the U.S.’s political and economic agendas, which has created a self-interested food aid policy that has not changed, only shifted causes from one war or market to the next (92, 115-117, 120). This has made the U.S. public more receptive to the opposition’s critiques of untying aid as causing a loss of American jobs (147-148). Proponents’ frames of the efficiency savings untying aid would create have not swayed the public since these benefits are ultimately framed as aiding recipients (84, 92, 115-117, 120, 130, 132, 140-142, 170). Proponents have not found a frame that fits with the self-interested purpose of American aid. The proponents’ message was also weaker because NGOs are divided on monetization and stakeholders are located outside of the U.S. (162, 164, 167-168, 179). In contrast, the opposition is united and well established. The combination of the many checks and balances and weak parties in the U.S. presidential system gave the opposition the time and opportunity to pressure Congressmen to stall reforms, even before they are up for debate (147-148).

Despite the policy difference between the U.S. and the U.K., in practice, neither country purchases food aid locally or regionally. Over 90% of contracts in both countries go to companies based in the donor country (47, 91, 94, 106).
Conclusion

Donor and recipient countries, aid groups, and international organizations have all questioned the U.S.’s continued use of a tied-aid delivery system (82, 84, 86, 90, 97). By comparing attempts to pass reforms in the U.S. to the U.K.’s switch to an untied model, I found that the adherence to the status quo is due to a combination of historical, institutional, and political factors in the U.S. system. Some of these factors were discussed in previous research while others only emerged through my comparative approach.

My findings confirm my overarching hypotheses that the U.S.’s history of a more self-interested aid policy, its incremental institutional structure, and the balance of its interest groups were all important factors in reinforcing the status quo. Beyond my predictions, I found that the U.K. had a similarly self-interested policy, but a combination of critical junctures created an opportunity for the U.K. to shift its aid policy, while the U.S.’s critical junctures have reinforced aid’s self-interested policy path. I also found that the way that opposition groups and proponents framed aid reforms in either country had an impact on whether or not policy change could occur. Surprisingly, this difference in policy has not led to a difference in how the U.K. procures aid as compared to the U.S., with both countries still awarding over 90% of their contracts to companies based in the donor country (47, 91, 94, 106).

The U.S. lacked the focusing events needed to change the self-interested path model

Both the U.S. and the U.K.’s original food aid policies were self-interested, but a combination of critical junctures helped the U.K. shift policy paths, while critical junctures in the U.S. system have reinforced the self-interested path (47, 49, 51, 56, 58, 70, 74, 77-78, 80-81, 84, 86, 89, 100, 103, 105, 107, 110, 115-117, 120, 127-128, 140-141, 147, 162-164). The U.K. created its initial aid policy to develop its colonies and increase the economic power of the U.K.
as an imperial power (49, 86). The U.S.’s policy began as a way to get rid of agricultural surplus at a profit (47,115-117, 120, 127, 132). But in the 1990s the Pergau Dam scandal made the British public critical of using British aid to pursue commercial goals and the creation and election of the New Labour Party created an opportunity for the U.K. to make linking aid and commercial interests illegal (56, 58, 70, 77-78, 80-81, 86, 89, 100, 103, 105). This allowed the U.K. to design a food aid policy that was more focused on recipient benefits and legally allowed a switch to an LRP procurement model. The U.S. did not have a focusing event the magnitude of the Pergau Dam scandal, but aid policy has reached critical junctures through politicians’ and presidents’ proposed reforms to switch more aid to an LRP procurement model (110, 115-117, 120, 127-128, 140-141, 147, 162-164). Almost every attempt has been shut down in Congress though, reinforcing the traditional self-interested trajectory of U.S. policy (115-117, 127-128, 140-141, 143-146, 149-150, 156, 162-164, 181).

The U.S. system’s incremental nature made passing reforms more difficult in the U.S.

The incrementalism of the U.S. presidential system is an important factor reinforcing the status quo. The president’s independent election (separate from the legislature) creates a system of incremental change in the U.S. (aided by the checks and balances of the system) (147-148). The U.S. has proposed multiple bills and reforms to shift towards more LRP, including attempts by presidents from both parties and bipartisan legislation, but the numerous hurdles to passing laws in the U.S. system and the political gridlock between the executive and legislature have reduced or completely prevented all changes (115-117, 127-128, 140-141, 143-146, 149-150, 156, 162-164, 181). However, the introduction of an LRP pilot program from President Bush’s proposed reforms and the expansion of this program to become a permanent and larger part of

Since the majority party in Parliament selects the Prime Minister, British policy changes in what is referred to as a “stop and go” model, where change is quickly passed into law when a party comes to power and reversed when the opposing party reclams power (19, 35). Blair and New Labour were elected in 1997 and, by 2002, they had completely overhauled the aid system according to their foreign policy position with the International Development Act (19, 35, 50, 52, 70, 80, 86, 89). With a guaranteed majority in the legislature, New Labour was able to untie its entire system without compromising with the opposition at all (19, 35). However, contrary to the usual British policy model, changes remained through a succession of different parties coming to power in Parliament (19, 35, 50, 52, 70, 80, 86, 89).

**U.S. opposition was stronger and used more effective frames than proponents**

The power of interest groups differs between the presidential and parliamentary systems, contributed to the importance of opposition views in the U.S. compared to the U.K. (19, 26, 35 108). American politicians are more vulnerable to the power of interest groups due to the individual nature of political campaigns in the U.S. and interest groups’ roles in funding campaigns and garnering support for candidates (19, 26, 108). There is also a larger policy window where interest groups can exert their influence in the U.S. due to the many checks and balances and political gridlock inherent in the presidential system (19, 26, 108). British politicians are insulated by the strength of their parties, who run their political careers from what district they will run in to every detail of their political campaigns, so interest groups do not have the same access and leverage over politicians (19, 35). The “stop and go” policy model
also means that laws are passed quickly, so there is less time for interest groups to express their opinions to British politicians (19, 35).

Opposition to reform is stronger in the U.S. than proponents while the reverse is true for the U.K. (68, 121, 140-141, 147, 161 166). U.S. opposition to food aid reform includes agribusiness, the shipping industry, and a collection of NGOs who oppose the elimination of monetization (selling aid in recipient countries to fund their other development programs) (110, 117, 120, 147, 155). They are an established coalition experienced in coordinating with each other and their members to pressure Congress (121, 147, 161, 166). Supporters struggle to compete because they lack a coherent agenda since one of their largest groups, NGOs, fluctuate based on the issue of monetization (117, 120, 130, 162, 164, 167-168,179). In the U.K., groups supporting reform have formed ActionAid, a united coalition that overwhelmingly and actively supported food aid reforms through research papers and formal responses to the proposed changes (53, 58, 64, 84). On the other hand, only two opposition groups, the Confederation of British Industries and the Export Group for the Constructional Industries, issued statements opposing any of New Labour’s reforms, and they were weak compared to the overwhelming support of ActionAid members (53, 58).

U.S. opposition has employed more effective framing of food aid reforms, which resonate with the American purpose of food aid. The U.S. opposition highlighted the loss of American jobs and economic benefits that the U.S. would experience from untying aid, which fits with the U.S.’s self-interested food aid policy (84, 113-114, 116-117, 119-120, 147-148, 150, 155-156). Proponents have countered these argument with discussions of the efficiency savings in terms of both time and money that LRP offers and the humanitarian benefits of building local markets and delivering more culturally appropriate food (48, 53, 55-56, 58-59,
However, recipient countries would experience the majority of these benefits, which has never been the primary focus of the U.S.’s aid policy.

In contrast, in the U.K. proponents were more able to find frames that resonated with the British people. U.K. proponents were able to use the public’s skepticism of aid after the Pergau Dam scandal to effectively frame the aid shift as a return to the moral purpose of aid, which would still deliver long-term economic benefits (47-48, 52-53, 55-56, 59, 61-62, 65-68, 73-76, 78, 80-86, 89, 91, 97, 99, 103, 107) The British public also accepted the frame of recipient benefits since it fit with the more altruistic purpose of food aid (with a focus on poverty alleviation) that they were attempting to return to after the Pergau Dam scandal. U.K. opposition did frame untying aid as causing a loss of U.K. jobs and limiting U.K. companies’ opportunities, but the support of interest groups and the public allowed New Labour to shut this critique down by telling companies to compete and win contracts or leave the industry (68, 81).

**The U.K. still awards about 90% of its contracts to British companies**

Collectively these factors have created an environment in the U.S. that has made policy change very difficult, but, although these same factors have enabled change in U.K. policy, it has not led to a shift in the model the U.K. actually uses to deliver aid. The U.S. system is largely unchanged due to the maintenance of almost all of the laws that outline the American aid system. Food aid still consists of the majority of their aid and 95% of contracts are tied (94, 117, 147). A larger proportion of aid is awarded to middle income countries that can provide the U.S. with the greatest benefits in return, but the expansion of the LRP pilot program in 2014 does demonstrate a slight shift towards the LRP model (47, 92, 112-114, 117, 119-120, 122,
The U.K. system, despite legally untying aid over ten years ago and receiving international acclaim for their recipient focused aid policy, still awards 90% of contracts to U.K. companies (47, 58, 91, 102, 106). It is possible that the lack of local contracts is due to unintended barriers experienced by local companies like lack of capacity and capability, a lack of access to U.K. bids, and the lack of expertise in how to apply for contracts (47, 58, 91, 106). An alternate explanation is that the U.K.’s decision to untie provided an opportunity for them to gain international power on the aid scene, but, by keeping their aid tied in practice, they can still accrue the traditional donor benefits that tied aid delivers like economic boosts, increased exports, and opportunities to pursue international political goals (91, 102).¹

**Further research, questions, and the strategy of untying**

I recommend that the U.S. follow the U.K.’s lead in formally untying their aid, but still deliver aid through the tied system in practice. Using this approach, they would not forfeit any of the traditional benefits donor countries receive from delivering aid, and they would alleviate the critiques from the international community that are based on their status as the only major donor who legally ties aid. However, the feasibility of this recommendation may be limited by the strong opposition coalition in the U.S., who will not want to lose the security of having their benefits guaranteed by the law, even if nothing changes in practice. If proponents of reform want to overcome this protest, my research indicates that it is important that they form one united position, frame that position with benefits that the U.S. will experience, and use focusing events that arise to rally the American public around the issue and proposed reforms.

Further research could look into the difference between U.K. policy and practice, important policy factors, and other countries. Given that the U.K. untied its aid policy but did
not switch to an LRP model, further research pursing why policy change did not translate to practical change in the U.K. would be useful for the field. Specifically, investigating whether this represents a strategic decision or is due to a lack of access is important to the field, would be valuable to humanitarian organizations that are attempting to give local communities more advocacies in their aid policies. It would also be useful to expand this analysis to other donors who have legally untied their aid to examine whether donors as a whole are only untying aid legally or if procurement methods are actually changing. Research assessing which other policy factors would be important to enacting change in food aid policy and quantifying the impact of different factors in order to determine which are the most important would also benefit efforts to create aid policies that create benefits for both donors and recipients.
### Appendix

#### Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Amount ($)^{17}$</th>
<th>% Tied$^{18}$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>$32.7$ B</td>
<td>95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.K.</td>
<td>$19.4$ B</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>$10.4$ B</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Netherlands</td>
<td>$5.5$ B</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>$3.9$ B</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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$^{17}$ (95)

$^{18}$ % Tied refers to the amount of aid that is legally required to be tied in each country
Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code Book</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Explanation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Historical</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Critical junctures</td>
<td>Pivotal moments in policy development whose results had the possibility to dramatically alter the development of the policy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Path dependency</td>
<td>Identify the overarching theme or policy focus after a critical juncture.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Institutional</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy Requirements</td>
<td>Codes text that outlines requirements of carrying out food aid policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incremental vs. “Stop and Go”</td>
<td>Code for how policy changes—is the change a rapid and dramatic change or is it a slower build off of the previous policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Systems of Administration</td>
<td>Notes different ways that aid is being delivered besides LRP and in-kind (vouchers, technical assistance to farmers etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country Selection</td>
<td>Which countries receive the most aid and the justification for why this is</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stall Tactics</td>
<td>Codes text that mentions common political stall tactics opposition employs to prevent change including recommending more research etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concession and Compromise (Include limiting it to emergency)</td>
<td>Codes text that appeals to the supporters of the status quo (in-kind will remain our primary aid delivery system etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Need for Bipartisan Support</td>
<td>Codes statements that mention the importance or need for bipartisan support especially to pass change in the U.S. system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Knowledge and Support</td>
<td>Codes statements that emphasize the importance of the general public’s supports and opinions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Political**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategic Frames</th>
<th>How aid and proposed reforms are portrayed to gain support or opposition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Categories under Humanitarian Frame</td>
<td>Humanitarian frames refer to any way of framing an aid delivery process that focuses on the human value it delivers—see below</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Local Market</td>
<td>How the food aid method impacts local</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Quality</td>
<td>How the food aid method ensures or lacks the mechanisms to ensure quality of food aid delivered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Cultural Preference</td>
<td>How food aid allows culturally familiar and normal foods or prevents this choice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Number of People</td>
<td>How food aid method is better than an alternative based on the number of people it will or has reached</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Reducing Vulnerability</td>
<td>Differs from local market in that it is not just about how it benefits the local market but specifically references preparing the community to better deal with future emergencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F. Recipient Ownership</td>
<td>Allowing the recipient to determine what and where they need aid and having a more active role in the partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficiency and Flexibility Frame</td>
<td>Talking about the time and money saved and the flexibility food aid reforms provide to development programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Interest Frame</td>
<td>Framing aid as beneficial to the U.S. in some capacity—see below</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>A. Economic</strong></td>
<td>Benefits American markets or economic interests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>B. Security</strong></td>
<td>Increases American national security or aligns with security interests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>C. Jobs</strong></td>
<td>Impact it has on jobs within the donor country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>D. Corruption</strong></td>
<td>Ensuring that the money is going where and to what it is supposed to be for</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Modernization Frame**

Based on the need to modernize the food aid process to be up-to-date with the times and today's climate

**Leadership Frame**

Justified as maintaining or establishing leadership in the field of food aid and using the most effective methods in the field

**Visibility Frame**

The ability to link aid to the donor country that donated it through country stamps on the side of boxes or bags of food aid

**Tried and True Frame**

Citing the accomplishments a food aid program has had and questioning why we would change something that has
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Variety and Balance</td>
<td>Supporting food aid reform in order to have the right tool at the right time and a balance of aid options</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capability</td>
<td>When this option is viable and its limits (for example LRP is often critiqued for not being able to deliver aid if all local markets are in shambles)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market Intelligence</td>
<td>Usually a negative for LRP, stating that it is limited and difficult to judge local market impacts without the appropriate amount of market intelligence on the ground</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest group positions and power</td>
<td>Codes when interest groups weigh in on the matter, where they stand, and how they exert their power to further their goals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDGs and International Agreement Goals</td>
<td>Codes text that cites that mentions the necessity of giving aid to meet the Millennium Development Goals or other international agreements</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 3

#### U.S. Results

| Historical          | • Cold War and economic tool  
|                     | • War on Terror  
|                     | • Failed Reforms  
|                     | • Reinforces self-interested path  

| Institutional       | • Incremental policy makes change difficult  
|                     | • Political negotiations important  
|                     | • Vulnerable to interest groups  
|                     | • Supporters < Opposition  
|                     | • **95% tied contracts**  

| Political           | • Increased efficiency  
|                     | • Reach more people  
|                     | • Recipient benefits  
|                     | • Concessions to opposition  
|                     | • Loss of jobs  
|                     | • New Risks vs. “Tried and True” |
| Historical                  | • Colonial Development Act 1929  
|                            | • Pergau Dam Scandal             
|                            | • New Labour Party               
|                            | • Shifted to recipient-focused policy |
| Institutional              | • “Stop and Go” policy allows change  
|                            | • Public opinion important       
|                            | • Insulated from interest groups  
|                            | • Supporters > Opposition         
|                            | • **90% tied contracts**         |
| Political                  | • Efficiency                     
|                            | • Moral purpose                  
|                            | • Long-term benefits             
|                            | • International leadership       
|                            | • Needed to meet MDGs            
|                            | • Loss of jobs                   |
Appendix A

Definitions

Bilateral Aid: “Aid from a single donor country to a single recipient country” (“Bilateral Aid” 2015).

Donor Country: A country that provides aid to a developing country (“Donor Country” 2015).

Local and Regional Procurement: “Refers to the purchase of goods and services from local businesses. Typically this occurs in emerging markets and in developed markets where local communities have expectations about participating in new opportunities” (“Local Procurement/2012).

Monetization: Selling food aid commodities in local markets to fund nonemergency food assistance programs (Waldie 2014).

Multilateral Aid: “Aid provided by a group of countries or an institution representing a group of countries such as the World Bank to one or more recipient countries” (“Multilateral Aid” 2015).

Recipient Country: A country that receives aid from another country (“Recipient” 2015).

Tied Aid: “Aid which is, in effect, tied to the procurement of goods and/or services from the donor country and/or a restricted number of countries” (Jaspers and Leather 2005).
Appendix B

Hypotheses and Observable Implications

Hypothesis 1:  
The U.S. federalist system has more institutional processes than the U.K. parliamentary system, so the incremental nature and checks and balances of the U.S. system have reinforced the tied aid status quo.

Implications:  
If my hypothesis were correct, we would see that amending policy is easier in the parliamentary system: requirements for amending laws, how legislators are elected and protected by their parties. We might also see more debates in the U.S. Congress proposing changes to food aid delivery U.K.: fewer changes to the food aid act over the course of history. In the original requirements set by Congress we might observe that legislative changes require more approval than the original political requirements to enact change in the U.K. We could also observe that the election cycle and party set up in the U.S. makes it more difficult for U.S. politicians to support changes than in the U.K.

Hypothesis 2: There are stronger political opponents and weaker political supporters in the U.S. as compared to the U.K., so political supporters in the U.S. have not been able to negotiate changes to the tied aid status quo.¹⁹

Implications:  
If this were the case, within the legislative documents and the memoirs of prominent policy members who attempted to change the food aid delivery system in both countries, we might see more contentious politics noted in the U.S. accounts than in the U.K.. We might observe more

¹⁹ In terms of political actors I will focus on parties, interest groups, lobbies and institutions. This analysis focuses on elite outside political forces instead of mass public opinion. Further research could be conducted on the influence of mass public opinion on food aid policy, since there is limited data available on it currently.
activation of political actors’ mass memberships in the U.S. than would be seen in the UK interest groups or more coordination between political actors who oppose change in the U.S. than political actors who oppose change in the U.K.

**Hypothesis 3:** The historical trajectory of U.S. food aid policy has led to more of a self-interest model of food aid in the U.S. than in the U.K., which has caused the U.S. to stick with the tied-aid delivery system (since it provides more benefits to the donor country).

**Implications**

Critical historical moments that determined the direction of U.K. food policy would demonstrate a focus on the most efficient aid practices, reaching the most recipient, and more changes in the food aid process. The U.S. would exemplify a larger focus on the domestic benefits that its citizens receive from delivering foreign aid (jobs, income from selling/shipping food abroad for the government etc.) and less changes to the food aid system. We could also observe fewer amendments being passed on the U.S.’s food aid policy where changes would decrease the benefits received by American businesses. The U.K.’s passed amendments might reflect more changes to improve aid efficiency and reach more recipients.
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