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Browsing by Duke-affiliated Author "McAdams, David"

DukeSpace

Browsing by Duke-affiliated Author "McAdams, David"

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  • Credible sales mechanisms and intermediaries
    McAdams, Prof David; Schwarz, M. (American Economic Review, 2007)
    We consider a seller who faces several buyers and lacks access to an institution to credibly close a sale. If buyers anticipate that the seller may negotiate further, they will prefer to wait before making their best and ...
  • Internal Markets for Supply Chain Capacity Allocation
    McAdams, Prof David; Malone, Thomas W. (SSRN eLibrary, 2005)
    explores the possibility of solving supply chain capacity allocation problems using internal markets among employees of the same company. Unlike earlier forms of transfer pricing, IT now makes it easier for such markets ...
  • Isotone equilibrium in games of incomplete information
    McAdams, Prof David (Econometrica, 2003)
    An isotone pure strategy equilibrium exists in any game of incomplete information in which (1) each player i's action set is a finite sublattice of multi-dimensional Euclidean space, (2) types are multidimensional and ...
  • Modifying the uniform-price auction to eliminate ‘collusive-seeming equilibria’
    McAdams, Prof David (Manuscript, MIT [www. mit. edu/mcadams/papers/mupa. pdf], 2002)
    The uniform-price auction is used in many regional electricity procurement auctions and its “collusive-seeming equilibria” have been linked to potential exercise of market power. Such equilibria do not exist, however, ...
  • On the failure of monotonicity in uniform-price auctions
    McAdams, Prof David (Journal of Economic Theory, 2007)
    Except for well-studied special cases in which bidders have single-unit demand or bidders are risk-neutral with independent private values, equilibria of uniform-price auctions with private values need not possess familiar ...
  • Partial identification and testable restrictions in multi-unit auctions
    McAdams, Prof David (Journal of Econometrics, 2008)
    Bidders’ values in discriminatory and uniform-price auctions are not necessarily point-identified under the assumptions of equilibrium bidding and independent private values, but meaningful policy analysis can proceed from ...
  • Uniform-Price Auctions with Adjustable Supply
    McAdams, Prof David (SSRN eLibrary, 2006)
    form-price auction with adjustable supply, the seller decides how much to sell after receiving the bids so as to maximize its ex post profit. Given N bidders and adjustable supply, all equilibria of the uniform-price auction ...
  • Uniqueness in symmetric first-price auctions with affiliation
    McAdams, Prof David (Journal of Economic Theory, 2007)
    The first-price auction has a unique monotone pure strategy equilibrium when there are n symmetric risk-averse bidders having affiliated types and interdependent values.