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Browsing by Duke-affiliated Author "Graham, Daniel A."

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Browsing by Duke-affiliated Author "Graham, Daniel A."

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  • Collusive Bidder Behavior at Single-Object Second-Price and English Auctions
    Graham, Daniel; Marshall, Robert C. (The Journal of Political Economy, 1987)
    In this paper we first develop a model of cooperative bidder behavior at a single-object (nondivisible) second-price auction within the IPV framework assuming risk neutrality of the bidders and the auctioneer. A central ...
  • Contract Modification: An Economic Analysis of the Hold-up Game
    Graham, Daniel; Peirce, Ellen R. (Law and contemporary problems, 1989)
    Our analysis concludes that the law correctly distinguishes between those modifications that should be enforced and those that are subject to the holdup game and therefore unenforceable. The findings also confirm that the ...
  • Cost Benefit Analysis under Uncertainty: Reply
    Graham, Daniel (American Economic Review, 1984)
    The implications of uncertainty for cost-benefit analysis remain controversial. Two related problems are the suject f this analysis. First, for any given future period, a dollar magnitude must be identified which appropriately ...
  • The Demand for Insurance and Protection: The Case of Irreplaceable Commodities
    Graham, Daniel; Cook, Philip (Readings in Insurance Economics, 1977-02)
    Insurance and protection against various kinds of losses are both valuable activities provided to a large and perhaps increasing extent by the public sector. If these activities are to be organized at an appropriate level ...
  • Differential Payments within a Bidder Coalition and the Shapley Value
    Graham, Daniel; Marshall, Robert C.; Richard, Jean-Francois (American Economic Review, 1990)
    Bidder Coalitions at English auctions frequently distribute collusive gains among members via a secondary auction or "Knockout". When Coalition members are sufficiently heterogenous, nested coalition structures are observed ...
  • The Economics of the Network-Affilate Relationship: Comment
    Vernon, J.M.; Graham, Daniel (American Economic Review, 1975)
    The purpose of this note is to correct serveral erros in the ingenius graphical analysis of the economics of network-affiliate relationship in the television broadcasting industry.
  • A Geometrical Exposition of Input-Output Analysis
    Graham, Daniel (American Economic Review, 1975)
    A number of important theorems have been developed regarding the qualitative properties that input-output and related economic models must possess in order to be viable. That a number of apparently different notions of ...
  • Profitability of Monopolization by Vertical Integration
    Vernon, J.M.; Graham, Daniel (Journal of Political Economy, 1971)
    It is generally accepted by economists concerned with merger policy that a monopolist does not have a profit incentive for intergrating forward into a competitive industry unless there are cost savings to be gained...
  • Public Expenditure Under Uncertainty: The Net-Benefit Criteria
    Graham, Daniel (The American Economic Review, 1992)
    Pulic expenditure under uncertainty is modeled as the problem of determining the quantities of l public goods and m private goods to be provided to n consumers when the private goods are claims to a single commodity, ...
  • Trader-commodity parity theorems
    Graham, Daniel; Jennergren, L. P; Peterson, D. W; Weintraub, E Roy (Journal of Economic Theory, 1976)
    Most economists know that given a number of alternative techniques for producing m goods, no more than m techniques need be employed to insure efficient production. Similarly, the optimal solution to a linear programming ...