Show simple item record

dc.contributor.advisor Taylor, Curtis en_US
dc.contributor.author Boleslavsky, Raphael en_US
dc.date.accessioned 2009-05-01T18:26:47Z
dc.date.available 2009-05-01T18:26:47Z
dc.date.issued 2009 en_US
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10161/1127
dc.description Dissertation en_US
dc.description.abstract <p>I characterize optimal long term contracts offered by a monopolist to a buyer whose private valuation evolves according to a branching process with privately known transition probability. The optimal contract can be implemented in a simple way, and presents the buyer with a tradeoff between a high initial fixed fee and low future prices. In an interaction with a long time horizon, the relationship will terminate prematurely with probability close to one. Optimal mechanisms are quite different from models in which the transition probability is known, and the buyer's private information is his initial valuation. Optimal contracts resemble the structure of term life insurance contracts, and have features similar to actual interactions between retailers and suppliers.</p> en_US
dc.format.extent 836332 bytes
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso en_US
dc.subject Economics, Theory en_US
dc.subject Dynamic Mechanism Design en_US
dc.subject Long Term Contract en_US
dc.subject Mechanism Design en_US
dc.title Dynamic Screening in a Long Term Relationship en_US
dc.type Dissertation en_US
dc.department Economics en_US

Files in this item

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record