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dc.contributor.author Trombold, Nicholas Davidson en_US
dc.date.accessioned 2009-09-16T15:35:02Z
dc.date.available 2009-09-16T15:35:02Z
dc.date.issued 2009 en_US
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10161/1421
dc.description Honors thesis, Department of Mathematics en_US
dc.description.abstract When disaster occurs, an authority explains the severity and gives citizens the choice to leave or stay. People complain they are not told enough regarding specifics that affect their safety. I propose a model explaining why an authority is vague due to its understanding of the citizens pessimism. While an authority may decide the disasters severity merits evacuation, a citizens definition of high risk may be different. To maximize its expected payoff, the government speaks vaguely to play off the citizens emotions and realign incentives. As the governments payoffs change in magnitude, its inclination to induce certain citizen action changes. en_US
dc.format.extent 1002225 bytes
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso en_US
dc.title Managing Crises with Vague Information...Just a Suggestion en_US
dc.department Mathematics en_US

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