| dc.contributor.author | Trombold, Nicholas Davidson | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2009-09-16T15:35:02Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2009-09-16T15:35:02Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2009 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10161/1421 | |
| dc.description | Honors thesis, Department of Mathematics | en_US |
| dc.description.abstract | When disaster occurs, an authority explains the severity and gives citizens the choice to leave or stay. People complain they are not told enough regarding specifics that affect their safety. I propose a model explaining why an authority is vague due to its understanding of the citizens pessimism. While an authority may decide the disasters severity merits evacuation, a citizens definition of high risk may be different. To maximize its expected payoff, the government speaks vaguely to play off the citizens emotions and realign incentives. As the governments payoffs change in magnitude, its inclination to induce certain citizen action changes. | en_US |
| dc.format.extent | 1002225 bytes | |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
| dc.language.iso | en_US | |
| dc.title | Managing Crises with Vague Information...Just a Suggestion | en_US |
| dc.department | Mathematics | en_US |