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dc.contributor.author Kranton, RE
dc.date.accessioned 2010-03-09T15:23:14Z
dc.date.issued 1996-09-01
dc.identifier.citation American Economic Review, 1996, 86 (4), pp. 830 - 851
dc.identifier.issn 0002-8282
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10161/1732
dc.description.abstract Reciprocal exchange, or gift exchange, remains a widespread means of obtaining goods and services. This paper examines the persistence of reciprocal exchange by formalizing the interaction between self-enforcing exchange agreements and monetary market exchange. When more people engage in reciprocal exchange, market search costs increase, reciprocity is easier to enforce and yields higher utility. Thus, personalized exchange can persist even when it is inefficient. Conversely, large markets can destroy reciprocity when reciprocal exchange is efficient. The results characterize the use of personal "connections" as a system of reciprocal exchange and explain the disappearance of reciprocity when tribes encounter markets.
dc.format.extent 830 - 851
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso en_US
dc.relation.ispartof American Economic Review
dc.title Reciprocal Exchange: A Self-Sustaining System
dc.type Journal Article
dc.department Economics
pubs.issue 4
pubs.organisational-group /Duke
pubs.organisational-group /Duke/Sanford School of Public Policy
pubs.organisational-group /Duke/Sanford School of Public Policy/Duke Population Research Institute
pubs.organisational-group /Duke/Sanford School of Public Policy/Duke Population Research Institute/Duke Population Research Center
pubs.organisational-group /Duke/Trinity College of Arts & Sciences
pubs.organisational-group /Duke/Trinity College of Arts & Sciences/Economics
pubs.publication-status Published
pubs.volume 86

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