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Reciprocal Exchange: A Self-Sustaining System.

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dc.contributor.author Kranton, Rachel en_US
dc.date.accessioned 2010-03-09T15:23:14Z
dc.date.available 2010-03-09T15:23:14Z
dc.date.issued 1996 en_US
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10161/1732
dc.description.abstract Reciprocal exchange, or gift exchange, remains a widespread means of obtaining goods and services. This paper examines the persistence of reciprocal exchange by formalizing the interaction between self-enforcing exchange agreements and monetary market exchange. When more people engage in reciprocal exchange, market search costs increase, reciprocity is easier to enforce and yields higher utility. Thus, personalized exchange can persist even when it is inefficient. Conversely, large markets can destroy reciprocity when reciprocal exchange is efficient. The results characterize the use of personal "connections" as a system of reciprocal exchange and explain the disappearance of reciprocity when tribes encounter markets. ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR en_US
dc.format.extent 9078015 bytes
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso en_US
dc.publisher American Economic Review en_US
dc.title Reciprocal Exchange: A Self-Sustaining System. en_US
dc.type Journal Article en_US
dc.department Economics

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