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dc.contributor.author McAdams, D
dc.date.accessioned 2010-03-09T15:27:04Z
dc.date.issued 2003
dc.identifier.citation Econometrica, 2003, 71 (4), pp. 1191 - 1214
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10161/1874
dc.description.abstract An isotone pure strategy equilibrium exists in any game of incomplete information in which each player's action set is infinite sublattice of multidimensional Euclidean space, types are multidimensional and atomless, and each player's interim expected payoff function satisfies two "nonprimitive conditions" whenever others adopt isotone pure strategies: (i) single-crossing in own action and type and (ii) quasi-supermodularity in own action. Conditions (i), (ii) are satisfied in supermodular and log-supermodular games given affiliated types, and in games with independent types in which each player's ex post payoff satisfies supermodularity in own action and nondecreasing differences in own action and type. This result is applied to provide the first proof of pure strategy equilibrium existence in the uniform price auction when bidders have multi-unit demand, nonprivate values, and independent types.
dc.format.extent 1191 - 1214
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso en_US
dc.relation.ispartof Econometrica
dc.title Isotone equilibrium in games of incomplete information
dc.type Journal Article
dc.department Economics
pubs.issue 4
pubs.organisational-group /Duke
pubs.organisational-group /Duke/Fuqua School of Business
pubs.organisational-group /Duke/Trinity College of Arts & Sciences
pubs.organisational-group /Duke/Trinity College of Arts & Sciences/Economics
pubs.volume 71

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