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dc.contributor.author Yildirim, H
dc.date.accessioned 2010-03-09T15:32:05Z
dc.date.issued 2007-09-01
dc.identifier.citation Journal of Economic Theory, 2007, 136 (1), pp. 167 - 196
dc.identifier.issn 0022-0531
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10161/1936
dc.description.abstract This paper studies a sequential bargaining model in which agents expend efforts to be the proposer. In equilibrium, agents' effort choices are influenced by the prize and cost effects. The (endogenous) prize is the difference between the residual surplus an agent obtains when he is the proposer and the payment he expects to receive when he is not. Main results include: (1) under the unanimity voting rule, two agents with equal marginal costs propose with equal probabilities, regardless of their time preferences; (2) under a nonunanimity rule, however, the more patient agent proposes with a greater probability; (3) while, under the unanimity rule, the social cost decreases in group heterogeneity, it can increase under a nonunanimity rule; and (4) when agents are identical, the unanimity rule is socially optimal. © 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
dc.format.extent 167 - 196
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso en_US
dc.relation.ispartof Journal of Economic Theory
dc.relation.isversionof 10.1016/j.jet.2006.07.008
dc.title Proposal power and majority rule in multilateral bargaining with costly recognition
dc.type Journal Article
dc.department Economics
pubs.issue 1
pubs.organisational-group /Duke
pubs.organisational-group /Duke/Trinity College of Arts & Sciences
pubs.organisational-group /Duke/Trinity College of Arts & Sciences/Economics
pubs.publication-status Published
pubs.volume 136
dc.identifier.eissn 1095-7235

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