DukeSpace
Uniqueness in symmetric first-price auctions with affiliation
DukeSpace
Login
DukeSpace Home
→
Duke Scholarly Works
→
Scholarly Articles
→
View Item
JavaScript is disabled for your browser. Some features of this site may not work without it.
Uniqueness in symmetric first-price auctions with affiliation
McAdams, Prof David
URI:
http://hdl.handle.net/10161/1941
Date:
2007
Abstract:
The first-price auction has a unique monotone pure strategy equilibrium when there are n symmetric risk-averse bidders having affiliated types and interdependent values.
Show full item record
Files in this item
Name:
McAdams_uniqueness_in_first_price_auctions.pdf
Size:
214.5Kb
Format:
PDF
View/
Open
This item appears in the following Collection(s)
Scholarly Articles
Articles
Search DukeSpace
Search DukeSpace
This Collection
Advanced Search
Browse
All of DukeSpace
Communities & Collections
Authors
Titles
Subjects
Duke-affiliated Authors
Duke Departments
Issue Date
Submit Date
This Collection
Authors
Titles
Subjects
Duke-affiliated Authors
Duke Departments
Issue Date
Submit Date
My Account
Login
Register
Statistics
View Statistics