Uniqueness in symmetric first-price auctions with affiliation

dc.contributor.author	McAdams, Prof David	en_US
dc.date.accessioned	2010-03-09T15:32:14Z
dc.date.available	2010-03-09T15:32:14Z
dc.date.issued	2007	en_US
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10161/1941
dc.description.abstract	The first-price auction has a unique monotone pure strategy equilibrium when there are n symmetric risk-averse bidders having affiliated types and interdependent values.	en_US
dc.format.extent	219693 bytes
dc.format.mimetype	application/pdf
dc.language.iso	en_US
dc.publisher	Journal of Economic Theory	en_US
dc.subject	First-price auction	en_US
dc.subject	affiliation	en_US
dc.subject	all-pay auciton	en_US
dc.subject	interdependent values	en_US
dc.subject	uniqueness	en_US
dc.title	Uniqueness in symmetric first-price auctions with affiliation	en_US
dc.type	Journal Article	en_US
dc.department	Economics