Public goods in networks

dc.contributor.author	Bramoulle, Yann	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Kranton, Rachel	en_US
dc.date.accessioned	2010-03-09T15:32:17Z
dc.date.available	2010-03-09T15:32:17Z
dc.date.issued	2007	en_US
dc.identifier.citation	Bramoulle, Yann and Rachel Kranton. Public goods in networks. Journal of Economic Theory. 135.1. (July 2007): 478–494. Print.
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10161/1943
dc.identifier.uri	http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2006.06.006
dc.description.abstract	This paper considers incentives to provide goods that are non-excludable along social or geographic links. We find, first, that networks can lead to specialization in public good provision. In every social network there is an equilibrium where some individuals contribute and others free ride. In many networks, this extreme is the only outcome. Second, specialization can benefit society as a whole. This outcome arises when contributors are linked, collectively, to many agents. Finally, a new link increases access to public goods, but reduces individual incentives to contribute. Hence, overall welfare can be higher when there are holes in a network.	en_US
dc.format.extent	183284 bytes
dc.format.mimetype	application/pdf
dc.language.iso	en_US
dc.publisher	Elsevier
dc.title	Public goods in networks	en_US
dc.type	Journal Article	en_US
dc.department	Economics
dc.relation.journal	Journal of Economic Theory