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dc.contributor.author McAdams, D
dc.date.accessioned 2010-03-09T15:32:18Z
dc.date.issued 2007-11-01
dc.identifier.citation Journal of Economic Theory, 2007, 137 (1), pp. 729 - 732
dc.identifier.issn 0022-0531
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10161/1944
dc.description.abstract Except for well-studied special cases in which bidders have single-unit demand or bidders are risk-neutral with independent private values, equilibria of uniform-price auctions with private values need not possess familiar monotonicity properties. In particular, equilibria in weakly undominated strategies may exist in which some bidders bid strictly less on some units when they have strictly higher values for every unit. © 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
dc.format.extent 729 - 732
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso en_US
dc.relation.ispartof Journal of Economic Theory
dc.relation.isversionof 10.1016/j.jet.2007.01.002
dc.title On the failure of monotonicity in uniform-price auctions
dc.type Journal Article
dc.department Economics
pubs.issue 1
pubs.organisational-group /Duke
pubs.organisational-group /Duke/Fuqua School of Business
pubs.organisational-group /Duke/Institutes and Provost's Academic Units
pubs.organisational-group /Duke/Institutes and Provost's Academic Units/Initiatives
pubs.organisational-group /Duke/Institutes and Provost's Academic Units/Initiatives/Duke Science & Society
pubs.organisational-group /Duke/Trinity College of Arts & Sciences
pubs.organisational-group /Duke/Trinity College of Arts & Sciences/Economics
pubs.publication-status Published
pubs.volume 137
dc.identifier.eissn 1095-7235

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