On the failure of monotonicity in uniform-price auctions

dc.contributor.author	McAdams, Prof David	en_US
dc.date.accessioned	2010-03-09T15:32:18Z
dc.date.available	2010-03-09T15:32:18Z
dc.date.issued	2007	en_US
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10161/1944
dc.description.abstract	Except for well-studied special cases in which bidders have single-unit demand or bidders are risk-neutral with independent private values, equilibria of uniform-price auctions with private values need not possess familiar monotonicity properties. In particular, equilibria in weakly undominated strategies may exist in which some bidders bid strictly less on some units when they have strictly higher values for every unit.	en_US
dc.format.extent	52174 bytes
dc.format.mimetype	application/pdf
dc.language.iso	en_US
dc.publisher	Journal of Economic Theory	en_US
dc.subject	affiliation	en_US
dc.subject	independence	en_US
dc.subject	monotonocity	en_US
dc.subject	risk-aversion	en_US
dc.subject	risk-neutrality	en_US
dc.title	On the failure of monotonicity in uniform-price auctions	en_US
dc.type	Journal Article	en_US
dc.department	Economics