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dc.contributor.author Romano, R
dc.contributor.author Yildirim, H
dc.date.accessioned 2010-03-09T15:32:20Z
dc.date.issued 2005-01-01
dc.identifier.citation Journal of Economic Theory, 2005, 120 (1), pp. 73 - 107
dc.identifier.issn 0022-0531
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10161/1946
dc.description.abstract We characterize equilibria of games with two properties: (i) Agents have the opportunity to adjust their strategic variable after their initial choices and before payoffs occur; but (ii) they can only add to their initial amounts. The equilibrium set consists of just the Cournot-Nash outcome, one or both Stackelberg outcomes, or a continuum of points including the Cournot-Nash outcome and one or both Stackelberg outcomes. A simple theorem that uses agents' standard one-period reaction functions and the one-period Cournot-Nash and Stackelberg equilibria delineates the equilibrium set. Applications include contribution, oligopoly, and rent-seeking games. © 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
dc.format.extent 73 - 107
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso en_US
dc.relation.ispartof Journal of Economic Theory
dc.relation.isversionof 10.1016/j.jet.2003.12.005
dc.title On the endogeneity of Cournot-Nash and Stackelberg equilibria: Games of accumulation
dc.type Journal Article
dc.department Economics
pubs.issue 1
pubs.organisational-group /Duke
pubs.organisational-group /Duke/Trinity College of Arts & Sciences
pubs.organisational-group /Duke/Trinity College of Arts & Sciences/Economics
pubs.publication-status Published
pubs.volume 120

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