On the endogeneity of Cournot-Nash and Stackelberg equilibria: Games of accumulation
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2005-01-01
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Abstract
We characterize equilibria of games with two properties: (i) Agents have the opportunity to adjust their strategic variable after their initial choices and before payoffs occur; but (ii) they can only add to their initial amounts. The equilibrium set consists of just the Cournot-Nash outcome, one or both Stackelberg outcomes, or a continuum of points including the Cournot-Nash outcome and one or both Stackelberg outcomes. A simple theorem that uses agents' standard one-period reaction functions and the one-period Cournot-Nash and Stackelberg equilibria delineates the equilibrium set. Applications include contribution, oligopoly, and rent-seeking games. © 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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Romano, R, and H Yildirim (2005). On the endogeneity of Cournot-Nash and Stackelberg equilibria: Games of accumulation. Journal of Economic Theory, 120(1). pp. 73–107. 10.1016/j.jet.2003.12.005 Retrieved from https://hdl.handle.net/10161/1946.
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Huseyin Yildirim
Professor Yildirim joined Duke Economics in 2000 after receiving a Ph.D. from the University of Florida. He is an applied microeconomic theorist with broad interests. He has written on such varied topics as dynamic procurement auctions, charitable fundraising, committee design, and, most recently, career concerns in teamwork and tournaments. His work has appeared in top economics journals, including American Economic Review, Review of Economic Studies, Journal of Economic Theory, and RAND Journal of Economics.
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