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dc.contributor.author Dinopoulos, E
dc.contributor.author Lewis, TR
dc.contributor.author Sappington, DEM
dc.date.accessioned 2010-03-09T15:33:51Z
dc.date.issued 1995-05-01
dc.identifier.citation Journal of International Economics, 1995, 38 (3-4), pp. 275 - 295
dc.identifier.issn 0022-1996
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10161/1956
dc.description.abstract We examine a government's optimal targeting policy when it has limited information about the learning curves of domestic producers. Popular arguments suggest that in order to promote learning-by-doing, the government might want to protect domestic producers from foreign competition by temporarily closing the domestic market to foreign producers. We identify a set of conditions under which such trade intervention is not optimal. Instead, domestic welfare is better fostered either by no government intervention, or by providing subsidies to the most capable domestic producers who are willing to set a particularly low domestic price for their product. © 1995.
dc.format.extent 275 - 295
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso en_US
dc.relation.ispartof Journal of International Economics
dc.title Optimal industrial targeting with unknown learning-by-doing
dc.type Journal Article
dc.department Economics
pubs.issue 3-4
pubs.organisational-group /Duke
pubs.organisational-group /Duke/Fuqua School of Business
pubs.organisational-group /Duke/Trinity College of Arts & Sciences
pubs.organisational-group /Duke/Trinity College of Arts & Sciences/Economics
pubs.publication-status Published
pubs.volume 38

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