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dc.contributor.author Sweeney, RJ
dc.contributor.author Tower, E
dc.contributor.author Willett, TD
dc.date.accessioned 2010-03-09T15:33:57Z
dc.date.issued 1977-01-01
dc.identifier.citation Journal of International Economics, 1977, 7 (4), pp. 349 - 362
dc.identifier.issn 0022-1996
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10161/1960
dc.description.abstract Bhagwati demonstrated the nonequivalence between tariffs and quotas in the presence of monopoly. This paper also assumes domestic production to be monopolized and shows that giving import licenses or tariff revenues to the domestic producer may raise or lower the welfare cost of protection and the price paid by consumers from the price under other tariff and quota arrangements which maintain the same market share for the domestic producer. However, if the monopolist realizes that commercial policy is an instrument used to maximize the policymaker's welfare function, instead of being a goal in itself, the equivalence of tariffs and quotas re-emerges. © 1977.
dc.format.extent 349 - 362
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso en_US
dc.relation.ispartof Journal of International Economics
dc.relation.isversionof 10.1016/0022-1996(77)90052-6
dc.title The ranking of alternative tariff and quota policies in the presence of domestic monopoly
dc.type Journal Article
dc.department Economics
pubs.issue 4
pubs.organisational-group /Duke
pubs.organisational-group /Duke/Trinity College of Arts & Sciences
pubs.organisational-group /Duke/Trinity College of Arts & Sciences/Economics
pubs.publication-status Published
pubs.volume 7

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