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dc.contributor.author Taylor, Curtis en_US
dc.date.accessioned 2010-03-09T15:37:36Z
dc.date.available 2010-03-09T15:37:36Z
dc.date.issued 1995 en_US
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10161/1989
dc.description.abstract A market in which the owner of a durable good, X, contracts with an expert for diagnostic and treatment services is studied. Good X may be in one of three states: health, disease, or failure. Only experts can determine whether X is healthy or diseased and perform treatment. The owner cannot tell whether recommended treatment is really needed. This creates an information-based demand for health insurance by risk-neutral consumers. Imperfections in the market for spot insurance may give rise to free diagnostic checks, strategic procrastination, and long-term health maintenance agreements. Copyright 1995 by University of Chicago Press. en_US
dc.format.extent 1956354 bytes
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso en_US
dc.publisher Journal of Political Economy en_US
dc.subject Breakdowns en_US
dc.subject Checkups en_US
dc.subject Cures en_US
dc.title The Economics of Breakdowns, Checkups, and Cures en_US
dc.type Journal Article en_US
dc.department Economics

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