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dc.contributor.author Lewis, TR
dc.date.accessioned 2010-03-09T15:43:21Z
dc.date.issued 1996
dc.identifier.citation RAND Journal of Economics, 1996, 27 (4), pp. 819 - 847
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10161/2068
dc.description.abstract I analyze different approaches for protecting the environment when stakeholders are privately informed about the costs and benefits of pollution reduction. The presence of asymmetric information calls for some important departures from the textbook prescriptions of marketable permits and emission taxes for controlling pollution. For instance, it may no longer be optimal to equate the social marginal benefits to the marginal cost of cleanup in determining appropriate abatement levels. I conclude this review with some suggestions for future research in this area.
dc.format.extent 819 - 847
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso en_US
dc.relation.ispartof RAND Journal of Economics
dc.title Protecting the environment when costs and benefits are privately known
dc.type Journal Article
dc.department Economics
pubs.issue 4
pubs.organisational-group /Duke
pubs.organisational-group /Duke/Fuqua School of Business
pubs.organisational-group /Duke/Trinity College of Arts & Sciences
pubs.organisational-group /Duke/Trinity College of Arts & Sciences/Economics
pubs.volume 27

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