Uniform-Price Auctions with Adjustable Supply

dc.contributor.author	McAdams, Prof David	en_US
dc.date.accessioned	2010-03-09T15:43:22Z
dc.date.available	2010-03-09T15:43:22Z
dc.date.issued	2006	en_US
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10161/2069
dc.description.abstract	form-price auction with adjustable supply, the seller decides how much to sell after receiving the bids so as to maximize its ex post profit. Given N bidders and adjustable supply, all equilibria of the uniform-price auction lead to price on order 1/N3 below the Walrasian price. By contrast, given the usual market-clearing rule it is well-known that the uniform-price auction can lead to equilibrium prices on order 1/N below the Walrasian price.	en_US
dc.format.extent	239352 bytes
dc.format.mimetype	application/pdf
dc.language.iso	en_US
dc.publisher	SSRN eLibrary	en_US
dc.title	Uniform-Price Auctions with Adjustable Supply	en_US
dc.type	Journal Article	en_US
dc.department	Economics