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dc.contributor.author Lewis, Tracy en_US
dc.contributor.author Sappington, David E. M. en_US
dc.date.accessioned 2010-03-09T15:44:21Z
dc.date.available 2010-03-09T15:44:21Z
dc.date.issued 1988 en_US
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10161/2092
dc.description.abstract Optimal regulatory policy is derived in a setting where the firm has better knowledge of demand than the regulator. When marginal production costs increase with output, the regulator can induce the firm to use its private information entirely in the social interest. When marginal costs decline with output, however, the regulator is unable to derive any benefit from the firm's superior knowledge, and a single price is established that is invariant to demand. en_US
dc.format.extent 878190 bytes
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso en_US
dc.publisher The American Economic Review en_US
dc.subject monopolist en_US
dc.subject regulation en_US
dc.subject unknown demand en_US
dc.title Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Demand en_US
dc.type Journal Article en_US
dc.department Economics

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