The Joint Determination of Household Membership and Market Work: The Case of Young Men

dc.contributor.author	McElroy, Marjorie	en_US
dc.date.accessioned	2010-06-28T18:58:52Z
dc.date.available	2010-06-28T18:58:52Z
dc.date.issued	1985-07	en_US
dc.identifier.citation	McElroy, Marjorie. The Joint Determination of Household Membership and Market Work: The Case of Young Men. Journal of Labor Economics. 3.3 (July, 1985): 293-316. Print.
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10161/2585
dc.description.abstract	Except in special cases, market work and household membership are jointly chosen. A Nash bargaining model of family behavior is used to specify stochastic structural relationships (two indirect utility functions and a market and a reservation wage function) that jointly determine work, consumption, and household membership. The maximum likelihood estimates of the implied trinomial probit model differ sharply from those obtained when either market work or household membership is taken as exogenous. This application to white male youths from the National Longitudinal Surveys shows the insurance function of families: parents insure their sons against poor market opportunities.	en_US
dc.format.extent	341434 bytes
dc.format.mimetype	application/pdf
dc.language.iso	en_US
dc.subject	choice	en_US
dc.subject	labor supply	en_US
dc.title	The Joint Determination of Household Membership and Market Work: The Case of Young Men	en_US
dc.type	Journal Article	en_US
dc.department	Economics
dc.relation.journal	Journal of Labor Economics