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dc.contributor.author De Marchi, Neil en_US
dc.date.accessioned 2010-06-28T19:05:20Z
dc.date.available 2010-06-28T19:05:20Z
dc.date.issued 1986-03 en_US
dc.identifier.citation De Marchi, Neil. Mill's Unrevised Philosophy of Economics: A Comment on Hausman. Philosophy of Science. 53.1 (March 1986): 89-100. Print.
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10161/2631
dc.description.abstract Hausman has argued that Mill in the Logic demands verification of qualified, inexact statements if they are to be considered lawlike. This puts Mill in line with a reasonable interpretation of what modern microeconomists are about, but requires the additional hypothesis that Mill abandoned his earlier stress on modal truth in his 1836 essay on the method of economics. The paper maintains that neither textual nor contextual evidence supports this hypothesis. Moreover, it is superfluous if one attends carefully to how Mill conceived economic science, which occupied a peculiar, somewhat isolated place in his own views on the deductive method and on verification. en_US
dc.format.extent 1370615 bytes
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso en_US
dc.publisher University of Chicago Press
dc.subject mill en_US
dc.subject philoshophy of economics en_US
dc.title Mill's Unrevised Philosophy of Economics: A Comment on Hausman en_US
dc.type Journal Article en_US
dc.department Economics
dc.relation.journal Philosophy of Science

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