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dc.contributor.author Taylor, CR
dc.date.accessioned 2010-06-28T19:05:25Z
dc.date.issued 2003-06-01
dc.identifier.citation RAND Journal of Economics, 2003, 34 (2), pp. 223 - 246
dc.identifier.issn 0741-6261
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10161/2634
dc.description.abstract I explore the practice of offering subscribers enticements to switch suppliers. This type of competition is natural in subscription markets for homogeneous goods and services. Efficiency is impaired because subscribers are induced to expend resources changing suppliers. Subscription markets are fully competitive only when three or more firms serve the industry. In this case, the price offered to switchers is below cost, while nonswitchers pay a premium. Each firm earns rent on its customer base, but zero expected profit on each new subscriber it attracts. When firms can track switching behavior, consumers may change suppliers in order to establish reputations.
dc.format.extent 223 - 246
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso en_US
dc.relation.ispartof RAND Journal of Economics
dc.title Supplier surfing: Competition and consumer behavior in subscription markets
dc.type Journal Article
dc.department Economics
pubs.issue 2
pubs.organisational-group /Duke
pubs.organisational-group /Duke/Trinity College of Arts & Sciences
pubs.organisational-group /Duke/Trinity College of Arts & Sciences/Economics
pubs.publication-status Published
pubs.volume 34

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