Renegotiation and Specific Performance

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1989

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Abstract

This article will examine the implications of enforcing specific performance for attempted breach of contract in a model of renegotiation. It will be shown that after the supplier receives relevant private information, renegotiation does not always occur even though gains from trade exist. Further, this article will argue that enforcement of specifice performance and result in a higher level of expected social welfare, appropriately defined, relative to the case where monetary damages for breach of contract are permitted.

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