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dc.contributor.author Lewis, Tracy en_US
dc.contributor.author Perry, Martin K. en_US
dc.contributor.author Sappington, David E. M. en_US
dc.date.accessioned 2010-06-28T19:40:28Z
dc.date.available 2010-06-28T19:40:28Z
dc.date.issued 1989 en_US
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10161/2647
dc.description.abstract This article will examine the implications of enforcing specific performance for attempted breach of contract in a model of renegotiation. It will be shown that after the supplier receives relevant private information, renegotiation does not always occur even though gains from trade exist. Further, this article will argue that enforcement of specifice performance and result in a higher level of expected social welfare, appropriately defined, relative to the case where monetary damages for breach of contract are permitted. en_US
dc.format.extent 1165142 bytes
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso en_US
dc.subject renegotiation en_US
dc.subject specific performance en_US
dc.title Renegotiation and Specific Performance en_US
dc.type Journal Article en_US
dc.department Economics

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