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SCIENTIFIC IMPERIALISM AND BEHAVIORIST EPISTEMOLOGY

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dc.contributor.author Staddon, John
dc.date.accessioned 2011-03-25T20:15:52Z
dc.date.available 2011-03-25T20:15:52Z
dc.date.issued 2004
dc.identifier.citation Behavior and Philosophy, 32, 231-242 (2004) en_US
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10161/3389
dc.description.abstract E.O. Wilson and B.F. Skinner have argued for an evolutionary ethics that allows what ought to be to be derived from what is—ethics from science. Evolution is inherently unpredictable, however, and some practices whose benefits cannot be proved might nevertheless turn out to be good for the survival of a culture or the race. Other practices that seem to be good might turn out to be bad. Consequently, the evolutionary argument implies that a successful culture will believe some things that cannot be proved, and it tells us that we cannot know in advance what those things will be. en_US
dc.description.sponsorship NIMH en_US
dc.publisher Cambridge Center for Behavioral Studies en_US
dc.title SCIENTIFIC IMPERIALISM AND BEHAVIORIST EPISTEMOLOGY en_US
dc.type Article en_US
duke.contributor.id jers en_US

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