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dc.contributor.author Hocutt, Max
dc.date.accessioned 2011-03-25T20:42:36Z
dc.date.available 2011-03-25T20:42:36Z
dc.date.issued 2009
dc.identifier.citation Behavior and Philosophy, 37, 165-180 (2009) en_US
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10161/3390
dc.description.abstract ABSTRACT: In an earlier essay in this journal, the estimable John Staddon charges B. F. Skinner and E. O. Wilson with committing several fallacies while promoting evolutionary ethics. The present essay replies that what Staddon regards as fallacies are signal contributions to a naturalistic understanding of ethical choice and language. en_US
dc.publisher Cambridge Center for Behavioral Studies en_US
dc.subject naturalistic fallacy, ethical naturalism, pragmatism, evolutionary ethics, genetic fallacy, value en_US
dc.title NATURALIST MORAL THEORY: A REPLY TO STADDON en_US
dc.type Article en_US
duke.contributor.id jers en_US

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