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Rationality, melioration and law-of-effect models for choice.

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dc.contributor.author Staddon, John
dc.date.accessioned 2011-06-05T09:33:25Z
dc.date.available 2011-06-05T09:33:25Z
dc.date.issued 1992-03
dc.identifier.citation . Psychological Science, 3(2), 136-141. en_US
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10161/3895
dc.description.abstract Economists usually assume that human choice behavior is rational, by which they mean that it maximizes some utility function. Psychologists are more impressed by the evident irrationality of behavior and tend to look for choice mechanisms (which cannot act rationally under all conditions). Richard Herrnstein (1990a) has recently argued that the choices of pigeons and people are dynamically driven by a moment-by- moment tendency to equalize payoff per unit of activity invested, a mechanism he terms melioration. I argue that economic models are not so bad, and melioration is not so good, as Herrnstein contends. The problem with rational choice is not that it is wrong but that it is too flexible. The problems with melioration are that it is poorly defined and refers only to events in the recent past (local events). en_US
dc.description.sponsorship This research was supported by grants from the National Science Foundation and National Institute of Mental Health to Duke University and from the A. von Humboldt-Stiftung to the author. en_US
dc.publisher Elsevier en_US
dc.subject rational behavior, choice, herrnstein en_US
dc.title Rationality, melioration and law-of-effect models for choice. en_US
dc.type Article en_US
duke.contributor.id jers en_US

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