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dc.contributor.author Tesarfreund, Matthew
dc.date.accessioned 2011-09-12T13:04:30Z
dc.date.available 2011-09-12T13:04:30Z
dc.date.issued 2011-09-12
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10161/4657
dc.description Winner of the 2011 Durden Prize en_US
dc.description.abstract Many critics partially attribute the severity of the 2008 financial crisis to a lack of regulatory oversight over credit derivatives. This paper will examine the governmental and private regulatory systems that aided the proliferation of these complex “financial weapons of mass destruction” and the ideological underpinnings that blinded users and regulators alike to their destructive power, focusing on credit default swaps (CDS), the most common credit derivative. Motivated by a desire to foster market growth and emboldened by their faith in financial innovation and the power of markets to self-regulate, public officials largely left the finance industry to its own devices. With that freedom the industry put in place structures that allowed the market to flourish. That is until an economic shock, in the form of a decline in housing prices, crippled an industry built on a foundation hollowed by its neglect of systemic risk. en_US
dc.language.iso en_US en_US
dc.subject financial crisis en_US
dc.subject derivatives en_US
dc.subject credit default swap en_US
dc.subject CDS en_US
dc.subject regulation en_US
dc.subject regulatory policy en_US
dc.title The Bankers Know Best: How Regulatory Policy Shaped the Rise and Fall of the Credit Default Swap Market en_US
dc.department History en_US

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