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dc.contributor.advisor Neander, Karen L en_US
dc.contributor.author Motsinger, Kyle en_US
dc.date.accessioned 2012-05-25T20:18:45Z
dc.date.available 2012-05-25T20:18:45Z
dc.date.issued 2012 en_US
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10161/5544
dc.description Thesis en_US
dc.description.abstract <p>One popular characterization of physicalism is as an empirical prediction about the theoretical objects and properties of future science. It is argued that physicalism so characterized cannot be justified unless an individual has idiosyncratic standards of inductive evidence. An alternative to this characterization of physicalism is a project that justifies physicalism according to the current science: all theoretical objects and properties can either be reduced to or eliminated in favor of the objects and properties of the current physical sciences. The extent to which this type of physicalism can be justified depends on an individual's epistemic rules and prioritization thereof.</p> en_US
dc.subject Philosophy en_US
dc.title Physicalism and Evidence en_US
dc.type Thesis en_US
dc.department Philosophy en_US

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