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dc.contributor.advisor Grieco, Joseph en_US
dc.contributor.author Axelrod, Mark en_US
dc.date.accessioned 2008-05-14T16:29:14Z
dc.date.available 2008-05-14T16:29:14Z
dc.date.issued 2008-04-21 en_US
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10161/628
dc.description Dissertation en_US
dc.description.abstract This project considers the pace of change in international law, focusing on sources of evolution and stagnation. I attempt to determine why negotiators defer to existing law in some situations and not others. To that end, this study explores country preferences towards the status quo in international negotiations. I hypothesize that deference to existing international law is more likely under four conditions. First, countries that have experienced a decline in relative power should promote deference to existing international law. Second, declining powers that have allowed private access by their citizens to existing international institutions should have greater domestic political pressure to protect those arrangements. Third, this relationship should be particularly strong if interested citizens are able to participate (perhaps through the ratification process) in subsequent negotiations. Finally, more complex negotiations (i.e., those including more participants) should result in greater deference to existing international law. The project tests these hypotheses with statistical analysis on a random sample of multilateral treaties, as well as case studies of negotiation practices in the United States, India, and the European Union. The analysis supports all four conjectures, and notes interactions between them. en_US
dc.format.extent 1969337 bytes
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso en_US
dc.subject Political Science, International Law and Relations en_US
dc.subject Political Science, General en_US
dc.subject Law en_US
dc.subject international law en_US
dc.subject international relations en_US
dc.subject international political economy en_US
dc.subject negotiations en_US
dc.subject Indian foreign policy en_US
dc.subject US foreign policy en_US
dc.title Saving Institutional Benefits: Path Dependence in International Law en_US
dc.type Dissertation en_US
dc.department Political Science en_US

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