Ward, PatrickWu, Tianqi2020-05-102020-05-102020-05-10https://hdl.handle.net/10161/20627The growing number of livestock has become a new threat to the ecological environment and wildlife in China’s biodiversity hotspots, especially for panda habitats. As China has announced the establishment of a giant panda national park that connects 67 giant panda reserves, there is an urgent need to control livestock and protect forests to ensure panda conservation and local economic development. Given the difficulties and inefficiency of governing multiple uses and users of local commons in these areas, there is an opportunity for local governance and collective management, such as cooperatives. This requires cooperation and coordination, which is never guaranteed. In this study, we explore herdsmen’s propensity for cooperation in the management of common property resources by conducting a framed public goods game among rural communities in Baishuijiang and Wanglang National Nature Reserves in Gansu and Sichuan province. We also explore how variation in socioeconomic factors may explain differences in contribution preferences of participants by asking them to fill out a survey related to social-demographic variables, grazing experience, trust level among community members, household income, and consumption upon completion of the experimental procedure. We find that the cooperation rate reduces to different degrees when there is a risk in returns and uncertainty on public return will lead to a greater reduction. We also find expected cooperation among peers is a big driver of voluntary cooperation. We do not find a significant relationship between trust levels and cooperative behavior. Also, we find that income and education do not have a significant impact on individual behavior. But we find that gender, ethnicity, and location can affect cooperative behavior.en-USVoluntary Contribution MechanismProvision Point MechanismEcological ProtectionNature ReservesChina