Browsing by Author "Dyreng, Scott D"

This paper examines whether deferred tax asset valuation allowance growth, as a measure of expected future performance, aggregated at the macroeconomy level, conveys information about future GDP growth. Using hand-collected tax footnote data from publicly traded firms over the 1993 to 2019 period, I find that quarterly aggregate valuation allowance growth is negatively associated with future GDP growth up to four quarters ahead. This relationship is incremental to existing accounting and macroeconomic GDP growth indicators, especially for forecast horizons longer than one quarter when other indicators are uninformative. Additionally, the findings suggest that aggregate valuation allowance growth provides unique information that cannot be obtained from other sources of management information, such as management forecasts, the allowance for doubtful accounts, banks’ loan loss provision, and goodwill impairment loss. The findings further indicate that the documented association of GDP growth and aggregate valuation allowance growth is driven by the corporate profit growth component of GDP growth. Collectively, the evidence indicates that aggregate valuation allowance growth provides incremental forward-looking information about GDP growth.

Earnings management could be motivated by either managerial opportunism or efficient contracting. To discriminate between these motivations, I use a measure of product market competition that analytical research predicts will discipline managers and better align their interests with those of shareholders. Thus, if earnings management reflects managerial opportunism, then an increase in competition will decrease earnings management; and if it reflects efficient contracting, then an increase in competition will increase earnings management. Consistent with earnings management indicating managerial opportunism, I show that an increase in competition decreases real earnings management in the form of overproduction to avoid reporting negative earnings or a negative change in earnings.

I examine a tax-related friction that limits U.S. multinational corporations’ ability to use foreign assets as collateral in obtaining U.S. debt financing. I find that tax-based collateral limitations are associated with reduced debt capacity and higher borrowing costs. Additionally, I show that collateral limitations are associated with a decrease in the use of capital covenants and an increase in the use of performance covenants in private debt agreements. While the U.S. House and Senate passed versions of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 that included provisions to eliminate tax-based collateral limitations, the final version surprisingly retained these limitations. I find a negative relation between the extent to which a firm is affected by tax-based collateral limitations and market reactions around the passage of the final version of the Act, suggesting tax-based collateral limitations constrain borrowing arrangements and thereby reduce firm value. The costs associated with these collateral limitations offer one explanation for the under-sheltering puzzle, which suggests firms fail to take advantage of the supposed benefits of tax avoidance strategies.