Browsing by Author "Hunt, Shane"

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    Compelling Interests: Understanding the Balance of Mandatory Autonomy Through Metropolitan Pressures
    (2009-05-02) Hunt, Shane
    Historians have long debated who is more influential in colonial policymaking, the so-called man on the spot or the national government. The fact of the matter is that some representatives overseas have more autonomy than others. While the British were enacting their mandate in Palestine after World War I, High Commissioner Herbert Samuel not only managed to hold his position as High Commissioner from 1920-1925 despite the shifting political moods back home, but he was able to enact most of the policy goals he had desired when he first set out. In contrast, the French Mandate in Syria and Lebanon went through five High Commissioners during a similar time period, each with slightly different policies and subject to the whims of politicians back home. The disconnect between the degree of autonomy exercised by the British and the French High Commissioners in Palestine and Syria, respectively, was a direct function of political sensitivity of the issue at home. The British High Commissioner had more freedom to act because the government had only indirect interests in Palestine, and was thus subject to fewer pressures at home, and so policy remained relatively consistent throughout many shifts in government. On the other hand, the French government had much more direct interests in Syria and Lebanon, and so the High Commissioners were forced to adapt to changing political pressures at home.
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    The Hidden Costs of Central Bank Borrowing
    (2012-04-16) Hunt, Shane
    This paper explores a previously overlooked unintended consequence of a private bank accepting Central Bank loans as a lender of last resort. Applying the basic Markowitz Security Model, I explore the potential effect of a private bank accepting a Central Bank loan as a signal of increased risk of investment in that private bank to the private markets. Finding a possibility that private investors will charge a penalty risk premium for having sought Central Bank financing, I consider the effects of this premium in three different game theoretic scenarios, each with a different set of assumptions that could apply in different Economic settings. Depending on the specific environment, possible effects include dependence on Central Bank financing, bankruptcy, or an eventual return to the private financial markets for future funding.