Browsing by Author "Medina, M"

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    Empowering 21st century biology
    (BioScience, 2010-12-01) Robinson, GE; Banks, JA; Padilla, DK; Burggren, WW; Cohen, CS; Delwiche, CF; Funk, V; Hoekstra, HE; Jarvis, ED; Johnson, L; Martindale, MQ; Rio, CMD; Medina, M; Salt, DE; Sinha, S; Specht, C; Strange, K; Strassmann, JE; Swalla, BJ; Tomanek, L
    Several lists of grand challenges in biology have been published recently, highlighting the strong need to answer fundamental questions about how life evolves and is governed, and how to apply this knowledge to solve the pressing problems of our times. To succeed in addressing the challenges of 21st century biology, scientists need to generate, have access to, interpret, and archive more information than ever before. But for many important questions in biology, progress is stymied by a lack of essential tools. Discovering and developing necessary tools requires new technologies, applications of existing technologies, software, model organisms, and social structures. Such new social structures will promote tool building, tool sharing, research collaboration, and interdisciplinary training. Here we identify examples of the some of the most important needs for addressing critical questions in biology and making important advances in the near future. © 2010 by American Institute of Biological Sciences. All rights reserved.
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    Pass the Bucks: Credit, Blame, and the Global Competition for Investment
    (International Studies Quarterly, 2014-09) Jensen, NM; Malesky, E; Medina, M; Ozdemir, U
    © 2013 International Studies Association. Both countries and subnational governments commonly engage in competition for mobile capital, offering generous incentives to attract investment. Existing economics research has suggested that these tax incentives have a limited ability to affect investment patterns and are often excessively costly when measured against the amount of investment and jobs created. In this paper, we argue instead that the "competition" for capital can be politically beneficial to incumbent politicians. Building off work on electoral pandering, we argue that incentives allow politicians to take credit for firms' investment decisions. We test the empirical implications of this theory using a nationwide Internet survey, which employs a randomized experiment to test how voters evaluate the performance of incumbent US governors. Our findings illustrate a critical political benefit of offering such incentives. Politicians can use these incentives to take credit for investment flowing into their districts and to minimize the political fallout when investors choose to locate elsewhere.