Browsing by Author "Munger, Michael C"

In this dissertation, I examine three sources of heterogeneity in voter choice that fit into two typologies. The first of these is inter-individual heterogeneity, or the idea that different types of individuals use unique models in evaluating candidates. I examine voters’ levels of moral conviction and voters’ partisanship as sources of this type of determinacy of decision criteria. My results indicate that the morally convicted differ in the shape of their utility function for candidate assessment. Instead of having a linear function representing the relationship between the candidate’s distance from their ideal points and how much they like the candidate, the morally convicted have a convex curve. I also find that the criteria on which individuals rate candidates differs based on whether they are partisan or moderate voters. I use the method of eye tracking to find that moderates tend to weigh candidates’ policy stances much less than partisans do.

The second type of heterogeneity explored is intra-individual heterogeneity, or the idea that the same individual uses different models depending on the context she is in. In an experiment, I find this type of heterogeneity is present: it is possible to prime people to use directional or proximity theory based on whether the issue is presented through a proximity-based framework or a directional-based structure.

This dissertation contributes to the literature on heterogeneity by providing a theoretical framework within which to think of different types of heterogeneity. It also provides something new in each chapter: Chapters 2 and 4 offer the first examination of these sources of heterogeneity while Chapter 3 uses a new method in political science.

Questions of party power and legislative outcomes are central to our understanding of Congress. And yet, our knowledge of these concepts has many gaps. We know little about exactly how parties negotiate legislative deals with their members—and hold them to their deals—or about how parties exert agenda control before bills reach the floor. We also have limited knowledge of how predictably the outcomes of bills are, particularly from their content. These questions remain unanswered largely because political scientists have traditionally not had data or methods at their disposal to answer them. In my dissertation, I provide some answers to these questions via a focus on text analysis.

In chapter one, I examine how parties make deals with recalcitrant members on landmark legislation, and more importantly, how members are held to their deals. Particularly, I argue that public statements are a tool wielded by the party, and when members are convinced to vote for a bill they are provided incentive to make a statement in support of the bill to lock them into their vote. Using a novel data set of all public statements made by members of Congress, and two pieces of landmark healthcare legislation (the Affordable Care Act in 2009-2010 and the American Health Care Act in 2017) I show that members of Congress do make public statements after they make deals to vote with the party, and that these statements are likely for the purpose of precommitting to vote with the party.

In chapter two, I seek to quantify the level of agenda control exerted by the majority party on bills that never reach a final passage vote. To do this, I present the first systematic estimates of how members would have voted on bills based on a characterization of bill content from bills’ text, would they have come to a final passage vote. I find that the majority party not only exercises negative agenda control, but also considerable positive agenda control. I also find that the minority party in the House is systematically and consistently shut out of the agenda process.

In chapter three, I investigate how predictable the outcome of bills is and whether bill content has a part to play in the predictability of bill outcomes. I find that I am able to predict where bills end up in the US House of Representatives with high accuracy, and that knowledge about the content of a bill has a sizable effect on how well I am able to predict bill outcomes.

I argue that ethical convictions are crucial to the maintenance and transformation of social institutions. Moreover, since ethical convictions are sometimes corrigible and open to persuasive transformation, ethical persuasion can be a powerful source of social change. However, I observe that the dominant analytic techniques of the social sciences are ill equipped to understand the nature and import of ethical convictions, and even less well equipped to inform ethical persuasion. I argue this, in part, explains why social science research has often proved of little value in trying to address prominent social concerns.

This diagnosis raises a puzzle and a challenge. The puzzle is why some social scientists would wholly commit themselves to methods that cannot adequately deal with important dimensions of social structure. I show this is due to a misguided conception of science, one which seeks an "absolute perspective" that requires reducing or explaining away ethical convictions.

The challenge, once this vision of science is rejected in favor of a more pragmatic one, is 1) to understand the systematic limits of different methodological approaches and 2) to see how an account of ethics, rightly understood, can complement social scientific knowledge in service of better social outcomes.

I evaluate three dominant methodological approaches in the social sciences, namely, statistical modeling, formal modeling, and biological-behavioral research. Although all are useful within certain domains, I show that each has systematic limits relating to the dynamism of ethical convictions. I demonstrate how these methods can fail on their own terms and can blind researchers to important resources for social change, such as possibilities for persuasion.

Finally, I develop an account of the relationship between ethics, rationality, and persuasion drawing on the work of Hans-Georg Gadamer, Alasdair MacIntyre, and Charles Taylor. This account rejects prominent "scientific" attempts to explain ethical allegiances as biologically hardwired or structurally determined, and it further challenges accounts of ethical naturalism and pluralistic neutrality.

I conclude by illustrating the constructive role that ethical persuasion has played in a number of development projects, which help demonstrate my thesis that debates about visions of "the good" matter profoundly for human flourishing.

American voters understand that elections have consequences, but they have become so disillusioned by their political system that approximately 40 percent have self-selected out of the two-party circus, choosing instead to identify as independent or unaffiliated which often requires them to forego their primary election voting rights. They understand that the process no longer serves its intended purpose of providing for representative government. Nevertheless, when it comes to elections, Americans get it wrong in just about every way possible. They spend so much time debating which superficial features of the electoral system—voter ID laws, polling place hours and locations, voter registration deadlines, etc.—are destroying the political process that they overlook the real cause of its decay: that political parties exercise control over the rules of the electoral system.

At the end of the day, people want a government that works. It is quite clear that the political system we have now simply does not allow for that. Less obvious are exactly why this is so, and what can be done. The role of this paper, then, is as a sort of citizen’s primer to our electoral crisis. I begin by tracing the origins of American political parties and describe how they and their agents in government mold the electoral system to their advantage in getting and maintaining control of government. Next, I discuss the ways in which that system is so deleterious to stable, functioning government and “national attachment” in the body politic. I then propose an alternative electoral system that would allow for fair and effective representation of more people, helping to rebuild the necessary trust and confidence in our fundamental political institutions. Finally, I reflect on the dangers of continuing to use a system in which political parties—private organizations—abuse state power and the fundamental institution of democracy—the election—to protect and advance their private interests, and how institutional collapse might be avoided.

This dissertation critically examines predominant political-economic theories of public credit and public debt in light of the origins, development, and recent record expansion in such debt. Using a "history of thought" approach, I focus on those aspects of theory, from three main schools of thought - Classical, Keynesian, and Public Choice - which seek to explain the evolution of public debt, its political-economic causes and effects, the meaning of sustainability in public debt burdens, and the conditions under which governments are likely to monetize or repudiate their debts. For empirical context, I also provide three centuries of data on public debt for major nations, relative to their national income, and government bond-yield data for more recent decades.

There is value in classifying the major political economists who have examined public credit and public debt since 1700 as "pessimists," "optimists" or "realists."

Public debt pessimists argue that government provides no truly productive services, that its taxing and borrowing detract from the private economy, while unfairly burdening future generations, and that high and rising public leverage ratios are unsustainable and will likely cause national insolvency and long-term economic ruin. When public debts become excessive or un-payable, pessimists advise explicit default or deliberate repudiation. Public debt pessimists also believe financiers in general and public bondholders in particular are unproductive. Pessimists usually endorse smaller-sized governments and free markets. With few exceptions, most public debt pessimists appear in the Classical or Public Choice schools of thought. Among prominent public debt pessimists, the most representative are David Hume and Adam Smith.

Public debt optimists believe that government provides not only productive services, such as infrastructure and social insurance, but means to mitigate what they perceived to be "market failures," including savings gluts, economic depressions, inflation, and secular stagnation. Optimists contend that deficit-spending and public debt accumulation can stimulate or sustain economy activity and ensure full employment, without burdening present or future generation. To the extent public debts become excessive or un-payable, optimists tend to advise implicit default, by official and deliberate debasement of the national currency (inflation). As do pessimists, public debt optimists view financiers and bondholders as essentially unproductive. Optimists also defend a relatively larger economic role for the state. Almost without exception, optimists reside in the Keynesian school of political-economic thought. Among the leading optimists, the most representative are Alvin Hansen and Abba Lerner.

Public debt realists contend that government can and should provide certain productive services, mainly national defense, police protection, courts of justice, and basic infrastructure, but that social and redistributive schemes tend to undermine national prosperity. Realists say public debt should fund only services and projects that help a free economy maximize its potential, and that analysis must be contextualized - i.e., related to a nation's credit capacity, productivity, and taxable capacity. According to realists, public leverage is neither inevitably harmful, as pessimists say, nor infinite, as optimists say. Realists view financiers as productive and insist that sovereigns redeem their public debts in full, on time, and in sound money. Realists favor constitutionally-limited yet energetic governments that help promote robust markets. They appear mainly in the Classical era of political-economic thought. The most representative and renowned of the public debt realists are Sir James Steuart and Alexander Hamilton.

My main thesis is that public debt realists provide the most persuasive theories of public credit and public debt, and thus the most plausible interpretations of the long, fascinating history of public debt. Moreover, certain puzzles and paradoxes arising in contemporary public debt experience, among developed nations - including the recent, multi-decade trend of simultaneously rising public-leverage ratios and declining public debt yields - is explicable primarily in realist terms. In contrast, public debt pessimists and optimists alike offer unbalanced, inadequate accounts of public debt experience. Whereas pessimists are too often confused or mistaken in foreseeing an alleged "inevitable" ruin from public debt, optimists more often than not are confused and mistaken about the alleged "stimulus" attainable by large-scale deficit-spending and debt build-ups. Looking ahead, the realist perspective is likely to provide superior guideposts for maximally-accurate interpretations of public debt policies and trends.