Browsing by Author "Myrick, R"

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    Do External Threats Unite or Divide? Security Crises, Rivalries, and Polarization in American Foreign Policy
    (International Organization, 2021-01-01) Myrick, R
    A common explanation for the increasing polarization in contemporary American foreign policy is the absence of external threat. I identify two mechanisms through which threats could reduce polarization: By revealing information about an adversary that elicits a bipartisan response from policymakers (information mechanism) and by heightening the salience of national relative to partisan identity (identity mechanism). To evaluate the information mechanism, study 1 uses computational text analysis of congressional speeches to explore whether security threats reduce partisanship in attitudes toward foreign adversaries. To evaluate the identity mechanism, study 2 uses public opinion polls to assess whether threats reduce affective polarization among the public. Study 3 tests both mechanisms in a survey experiment that heightens a security threat from China. I find that the external threat hypothesis has limited ability to explain either polarization in US foreign policy or affective polarization among the American public. Instead, responses to external threats reflect the domestic political environment in which they are introduced. The findings cast doubt on predictions that new foreign threats will inherently create partisan unity.
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    Making Sense of Human Rights Diplomacy: Evidence from a US Campaign to Free Political Prisoners
    (International Organization) Myrick, R; Weinstein, JM
    Abstract Scholarship on human rights diplomacy (HRD)—efforts by government officials to engage publicly and privately with their foreign counterparts—often focuses on actions taken to “name and shame” target countries because private diplomatic activities are unobservable. To understand how HRD works in practice, we explore a campaign coordinated by the US government to free twenty female political prisoners. We compare release rates of the featured women to two comparable groups: a longer list of women considered by the State Department for the campaign; and other women imprisoned simultaneously in countries targeted by the campaign. Both approaches suggest that the campaign was highly effective. We consider two possible mechanisms through which expressive public HRD works: by imposing reputational costs and by mobilizing foreign actors. However, in-depth interviews with US officials and an analysis of media coverage find little evidence of these mechanisms. Instead, we argue that public pressure resolved deadlock within the foreign policy bureaucracy, enabling private diplomacy and specific inducements to secure the release of political prisoners. Entrepreneurial bureaucrats leveraged the spotlight on human rights abuses to overcome competing equities that prevent government-led coercive diplomacy on these issues. Our research highlights the importance of understanding the intersection of public and private diplomacy before drawing inferences about the effectiveness of HRD.
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    Public Reactions to Secret Negotiations in International Politics
    (Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2023-01-01) Myrick, R
    Many international agreements, from routine trade deals to high-stakes nuclear agreements, are negotiated in secret. However, we have a limited understanding of how secrecy in a negotiation shapes attitudes towards the agreement. Public opinion matters because it informs government decisions about when to conceal or reveal information during a negotiation. In a survey experiment of U.S. adults, I first examine overall attitudes towards secrecy in security and economic agreements. I then randomize government justifications for negotiating in secret: improved success, protection of sensitive information, and anticipation of criticism from domestic and international opponents. I find that respondents are generally averse to secrecy in international negotiations, but there are justifications for its use that they perceive as more legitimate. Secrecy is more permissible when negotiations contain sensitive information or when it improves the likelihood that agreements are reached. It is less permissible when governments negotiate in secret to avoid domestic criticism.
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    Reflections on Using Annotation for Transparent Inquiry in Mixed-Methods Research
    (PS: Political Science & Politics, 2021-07) Myrick, R
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    Towards a unified approach to research on democratic backsliding
    (Democratization) Jee, H; Lueders, H; Myrick, R