Browsing by Author "Rousseliere, Genevieve"

In this paper, I aim to outline the structure of counterexample objection and provide some points for consideration regarding its methodological effectiveness. In order to highlight the peculiarities of counterexample objection, I closely study an example case of it, which would be Anderson’s harshness objection. Once the methodology of the objection and the subsequent literature are studied, I proceed to specify the analytical aspects of counterexample objection. In this regard, the trolley problem will be referenced for analytical peculiarities of hypothetical examples, alongside with the more specific accounts of Rawls and Sen made on the methodology of objection using counterexamples. After demonstrating that mechanism of counterexample objections requires an assumption on moral intuition, I highlight this aspect with reference to Warnke’s “hermeneutic turn” in political philosophy, while reiterating the incomplete theoretical role of hypothetical examples that has been manifested within the literature on the trolley problem. Finally, I conclude by insisting that the entire discussion confirms that the effectiveness of a counterexample objection in fulfilling its purpose – namely, defeating a normative principle – should be limited since the prerequisite condition of moral consensus is often too demanding: the fact which should thus be fully acknowledged when employing this method of objection.

A fair game is fair from the perspective of winners and losers alike. A perfectly just political system is in principle fair to all its participants regardless of their specific position, performance, or distribution of rewards. If democracy is a normatively ideal form of government, it should be able to justify itself even to persistent minorities, stable groups who are outvoted continuously. This thesis intends to test the robustness of democratic legitimacy through analyzing whether and how democracy can be a fair play for its “constant losers.” I investigate and critique two major frameworks of understanding the persistent minority case: the pure proceduralist account and the moderate proceduralist account, and argue for a more useful conceptual tool of deliberative power. I discover that the key to unravelling the puzzle of the fairness of persistent minorities is their voice in the political sphere or their lack thereof, rather than simply the abstract fairness of electoral rules as argued by the hardline proceduralists, or the immediate impact of consistent failures in voting on individual interests as emphasized by the moderate proceduralists. My conclusion is that democracy, though not necessarily capable of guaranteeing all individuals equal decisiveness over politics, can reassure persistent minorities of a reasonable chance to make a difference by bringing their voice back to the public space with the mechanism of public justification. It is having a say on public affairs that grounds the moral authority of democracy.

In this essay, I reexamine the anti-pornography argument put forward by feminist scholars such as Catherine MacKinnon and Rae Langton in the contemporary context from a culturally distinctive perspective. In my analysis, I take issue with two problems in the anti-pornography argument: its arbitrary distinction between pornography and erotica, and its oversight of how the regulation of pornography could potentially reinforce women’s subordination. As such, I conclude that the regulation of pornography is neither pragmatic given its prevalent digital distribution in the contemporary world, nor beneficial to its cause. As an alternative, I propose that we open to the possibility of feminist pornography, which potentially enables women to express their sexuality and regain control of their bodies.

Allan Bloom observes that the “Enlightenment wished to convert the selfishness of man in the state of nature into the enlightened self-interest of man capable of joining civil society.” Amidst this backdrop of philosophers championing self-interest as man’s only true desire and reason as man’s most effective moral tool, Rousseau emerges as their greatest contrarian. Rousseau is adamant that there is not one but two principles of nature: self-preservation and pity. These two principles work together in tandem for the benefit of mankind. Pity is what naturally restrains us from unduly harming each other in the pursuit of our individual desires—it is what makes men more than “monsters.”

According to Rousseau, there was a de facto state of equality in nature, and the moral problems of society are actually the result of the interplay between reason and self-interest which make men establish and crave artificial inequalities (like wealth and power). In the Social Contract, Rousseau argues that well-ordered societies are those that tend to the general will, which refers to the collective desires of the state, or the body politic. The general will exists on account of the social pact in which each member of state has equal sovereignty. Although Rousseau does not make explicit mention of pity in the Social Contract, this paper examines the literature more wholistically in order to draw connections between pity and the general will. These connections point to how pity should be considered more seriously as a moral and social tool to remedy society. Whereas the history of Western philosophy tends to focus on self-interest and individualism, Rousseau’s emphasis on pity and the general will presents a fruitful avenue of exploration for those looking for alternative (and more collectively-oriented) solutions.