Browsing by Author "Sappington, D"

Now showing 1 - 4 of 4
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    Incentives for Conservation and Quality-Improvement by Public Utilities
    (1992) Lewis, TR; Sappington, D
    We examine the design of incentive programs to motivate regulated utilities to supply both basic service (e.g., electricity supply, local telephone service) and service enhancements (e.g., energy-conservation services, improved clarity and speed of voice communication). The optimal regulatory programs are shown to vary greatly, depending upon the information available to the regulator. The price of the basic service may optimally be distorted above or below marginal cost to better motivate the supply of the service enhancement. Our policy prescriptions are compared with current programs and proposals to promote energy conservation.
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    Inflexible Rules in Incentive Problems
    (1989) Lewis, TR; Sappington, D
    In practice, contracts involve "standard terms" or "rules," allowing for variations only under "exceptional" circumstances. We develop a simple model in which optimal contracts display this feature, even in the absence of transactions costs. Rules arise when an agent has "countervailing incentives" to misrepresent private information. These incentives are created by endowing the agent with a critical factor of production ex ante. Applications in regulatory, labor, and legal settings are developed.
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    Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Demand
    (1988) Lewis, TR; Sappington, D
    Optimal regulatory policy is derived in a setting where the firm has better knowledge of demand than the regulator. When marginal production costs increase with output, the regulator can induce the firm to use its private information entirely in the social interest. When marginal costs decline with output, however, the regulator is unable to derive any benefit from the firm's superior knowledge, and a single price is established that is invariant to demand.
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    Renegotiation and Specific Performance
    (1989) Lewis, TR; Sappington, D; Perry, M
    This article will examine the implications of enforcing specific performance for attempted breach of contract in a model of renegotiation. It will be shown that after the supplier receives relevant private information, renegotiation does not always occur even though gains from trade exist. Further, this article will argue that enforcement of specifice performance and result in a higher level of expected social welfare, appropriately defined, relative to the case where monetary damages for breach of contract are permitted.