Browsing by Author "Spragens, Thomas A"

In this dissertation, I develop a political liberal ethics of citizenship that reconciles conflicting religious and civic obligations concerning political participation and deliberation--a liberal-democratic ethics of citizenship that is compatible with religious integrity. I begin by canvassing the current state of the debate between political liberals and their religious critics, engaging Rawls's Political Liberalism and the various religious objections Nicholas Wolterstorff, Christopher Eberle, Robert George, John Finnis, Paul Weithman, Jeffrey Stout, and Gerald Gaus and Kevin Vallier develop (Chapter One). I then critically evaluate political liberalism's requirements of citizens in light of the religious objections and the religious objections in light of political liberal norms of reciprocity, concluding that some religious citizens have legitimate complaints against citizenship requirements that forbid citizens from offering religious arguments alone in public political discussions (Chapter Two). Next, I propose an alternative set of guidelines for public political discussions in constitutional democracies, the phased account of democratic decision-making, that, I argue, addresses the religious citizens' legitimate complaints without undermining a constitutional democracy's legitimacy or commitment to public justification (Chapter Three). Then, I argue that a religious practice of political engagement I call prophetic witnessing is compatible with the phased account, can serve as a canonical model to guide religious citizens' political participation, and can help religious citizens navigate the substantive conflicts between their religious and civic obligations that remain possible even in a society that follows the phased account (Chapter Four). Finally, I conclude by imagining three different democracies, each adhering to a different set of guidelines for public political discussions, in order to argue for the benefit of adopting norms that balance citizens' obligations to govern themselves legitimately with citizens' ability to integrate their deepest moral and religious commitments and their public, political argument and advocacy.

My dissertation seeks to clarify the stakes of recent calls to increase civic friendship in our communities by initiating a conversation between contemporary and historical theoretical work about the requirements and consequences of using friendship as a model for social and political relationships between citizens. Friends’ lives are bound together by shared activity and by mutual concern and support; in what ways do relations between citizens, who often begin as strangers, take up these attitudes and behaviors? What kinds of civic friendship are possible in our contemporary democratic communities? How are they cultivated? And what are their political advantages and disadvantages? These questions guide the project as a whole.

I begin by canvassing some recent and popular work by Robert Bellah et al., Robert Putnam, and Danielle Allen in order to clarify the claims they make about different forms of civic friendship. The chapters that follow focus on the work of Aristotle, Tocqueville, and Adam Smith respectively in order to respond to various gaps I find in the contemporary accounts. I assess what each thinker, contemporary and canonical, can offer us today as we continue to think about the most sustainable and fair ways in which citizens can relate to one another in vast and diverse contemporary democracies. Along the way I address several important over-arching issues: the relationship between self-interest and care for others; the relationship between different sorts of equality and civic friendship; and the different roles that reason, emotions, habits, and institutions play in the cultivation of various kinds of civic friendship. I conclude that equality and justice ought to be both prerequisites and consequences of civic friendship, that self-interest is not a sufficient source for robust civic friendship and that instead some kind of imaginative and emotional motivation is needed, and that civic friendship must be understood as both a moral and a political phenomenon.

My dissertation offers an interpretation of twentieth century political thought which emphasizes the influence of dystopian images, themes, and anxieties. Drawing examples from philosophy, literature, and social science, I show how negative visions of future society have played an important critical function in our contemporary understanding of freedom, power, and responsibility. In contrast to those who associate dystopia with cynicism or despair, I aim to provide a more nuanced and sympathetic account of a mode of thinking which gives twentieth century political thought much of its distinctiveness and vitality, and continues to inform ethical and political judgment in our time. Throughout the dissertation, I offer commentaries on the emergence and decline of modern utopianism (Chapter 1); Huxley’s and Orwell’s seminal dystopian novels (Chapter 2); the role of paradigmatic dystopian images related to totalitarianism, mass society, and technocracy in post-war political discourse (Chapter 3) and; the innovative contributions to these discourses made by Hannah Arendt, Jürgen Habermas, and Michel Foucault (Chapter 4).

This book addresses the polarization and the erosion of liberal democratic norms and institutions that increasingly define contemporary liberal democratic politics. More specifically, it aims to address the question of how pluralistic liberal democracies ought to secure stability in a manner that both conforms to the normative contours of liberal democracy and facilitates the rectification and identification of injustices.

My broad argument is that liberal democracies can only hold themselves together and become the best possible versions of themselves when their citizens are political friends. First, I advance ‘the basic’ case for why we should appeal to political friendship. I pursue an interpretation of Aristotle’s articulation of the concept to demonstrate that the central concern of political friendship is the cultivation of a political sense of togetherness among citizens who adhere to a plurality of interests and conceptions of justice. I supplement this argument by demonstrating why alternative solutions to the problem are insufficient. Second, I think seriously about how to reinforce political friendship in conditions of modern pluralism. Specifically, I develop an understanding of political friendship that can ensure that citizens who share political sense of togetherness will be able to express their differences and disagreements manageably and equitably. This sort of political friendship draws on multiple notions of political friendship: citizens are political friends by virtue of the cognitive lens or metaphor(s) through which they consider politics and their social relations, of their common civic-national identity, and of the subset of the citizenry with whom they personally practice political friendship – a subset that can plausibly be described as representative of the citizenry as a whole.

This dissertation examines whether democratic citizens are responsible for the behavior of their governments. Through careful analysis of the political theory and practice of Henry David Thoreau and Jane Addams, I demonstrate that notions of democracy that are distinctly modern in their emphasis upon plurality and individuality can instill in citizens a sense of responsibility for public life. My analysis also calls attention to several challenges that make ethical democratic citizenship a demanding undertaking. In the final chapters, I construct an account of responsible democratic citizenship that addresses these challenges, drawing upon lessons learned from my discussion of Thoreau and Addams, as well as from more contemporary thinkers. Democratic citizens, I argue, do not fully control the circumstances in which they act, and thus they often become implicated in outcomes to which they have not explicitly consented. If they aspire to be self-ruling, however, they must accept some responsibility for political outcomes that affect their own wellbeing and are affected by their behavior. Furthermore, I argue that citizens are unlikely to recognize and discharge their shared responsibilities unless they cultivate particular attitudes, including curiosity, flexibility, sympathy, humility and courage. These attitudes enable citizens to learn about the problems for which they are responsible and cooperate with others to solve shared problems.

This thesis addresses how Alexis de Tocqueville’s political thought is related to American Exceptionalism. First, I illustrate the multiple meanings of the concept of American Exceptionalism and in what sense it is indebted to Tocqueville. Second, I articulate how the historical background and personal qualities of Tocqueville contribute to the success of his masterpiece Democracy in America. In the main part, by analyzing Tocqueville’s Democracy in America and other writings on America, I argue that he indeed reveals America as exceptional and increasingly recognizes this idea through a process of intellectual development. An elaboration on Tocqueville’s theoretical contribution to the discussion of American Exceptionalism can reveal the different images of modern democracy as he suggests and how they would influence the prospect of human freedom.

In this dissertation, I advance a new interpretation of the meaning and political implications of Isaiah Berlin's theory of value pluralism. My argument focuses on two puzzles within the literature on value pluralism: first, value pluralist political theorists advance a variety of differing political views on an ostensibly value pluralist basis; second, and more deeply, their writings betray significant ambiguity on what value pluralism means in the first place. I identify two central sources of these problems. First, two distinct sets of ideas in Berlin's work, which I label the "moral-practical" and "societal groupings" versions of value pluralism, are persistently conflated by both Berlin and more recent value pluralist theorists. Second, attempts to justify a political view on the basis of value pluralism run aground on a "priority problem" stemming from the central value pluralist concept of incommensurability. In my approach, I maintain the distinction between the moral-practical and societal groupings theories, focusing on the moral-practical version as a more original and less well-understood contribution of Berlin's thought. I also develop a strategy, which I call "giving incommensurability its due," that avoids the priority problem by focusing on metaethical (or second-order), epistemic, and procedural considerations. This strategy supports two major sets of political implications: a liberal-constitutional framework of basic rights and liberties, and a robust, vibrant form of participatory and deliberative democratic politics. This turn to democracy constitutes an important shift vis-à-vis the current literature, which has, up to now, been preoccupied with value pluralism's relationship to liberalism.