Browsing by Author "Stanley, Matthew L"

Now showing 1 - 3 of 3
  • Thumbnail Image
    ItemOpen Access
    Counterfactual Plausibility and Comparative Similarity.
    (Cognitive science, 2017-05) Stanley, Matthew L; Stewart, Gregory W; Brigard, Felipe De
    Counterfactual thinking involves imagining hypothetical alternatives to reality. Philosopher David Lewis (1973, 1979) argued that people estimate the subjective plausibility that a counterfactual event might have occurred by comparing an imagined possible world in which the counterfactual statement is true against the current, actual world in which the counterfactual statement is false. Accordingly, counterfactuals considered to be true in possible worlds comparatively more similar to ours are judged as more plausible than counterfactuals deemed true in possible worlds comparatively less similar. Although Lewis did not originally develop his notion of comparative similarity to be investigated as a psychological construct, this study builds upon his idea to empirically investigate comparative similarity as a possible psychological strategy for evaluating the perceived plausibility of counterfactual events. More specifically, we evaluate judgments of comparative similarity between episodic memories and episodic counterfactual events as a factor influencing people's judgments of plausibility in counterfactual simulations, and we also compare it against other factors thought to influence judgments of counterfactual plausibility, such as ease of simulation and prior simulation. Our results suggest that the greater the perceived similarity between the original memory and the episodic counterfactual event, the greater the perceived plausibility that the counterfactual event might have occurred. While similarity between actual and counterfactual events, ease of imagining, and prior simulation of the counterfactual event were all significantly related to counterfactual plausibility, comparative similarity best captured the variance in ratings of counterfactual plausibility. Implications for existing theories on the determinants of counterfactual plausibility are discussed.
  • Thumbnail Image
    ItemOpen Access
    Intellectual humility and perceptions of political opponents.
    (Journal of personality, 2020-06-02) Stanley, Matthew L; Sinclair, Alyssa H; Seli, Paul
    OBJECTIVE:Intellectual humility (IH) refers to the recognition that personal beliefs might be wrong. We investigate possible interpersonal implications of IH for how people perceive the intellectual capabilities and moral character of their sociopolitical opponents and for their willingness to associate with those opponents. METHOD:In four initial studies (N = 1,926, Mage  = 38, 880 females, 1,035 males), we measured IH, intellectual and moral derogation of opponents, and willingness to befriend opponents. In two additional studies (N = 568, Mage  = 40, 252 females, 314 males), we presented participants with a specific opponent on certain sociopolitical issues and several social media posts from that opponent in which he expressed his views on the issue. We then measured IH, intellectual, and moral derogation of the opponent, participants' willingness to befriend the opponent, participants' willingness to "friend" the opponent on social media, and participants' willingness to "follow" the opponent on social media. RESULTS:Low-IH relative to high-IH participants were more likely to derogate the intellectual capabilities and moral character of their opponents, less willing to befriend their opponents, and less willing to "friend" and "follow" an opponent on social media. CONCLUSIONS:IH may have important interpersonal implications for person perception, and for understanding social extremism and polarization.
  • Thumbnail Image
    ItemOpen Access
    Resting-state networks do not determine cognitive function networks: a commentary on Campbell and Schacter (2016)
    (Language, Cognition and Neuroscience, 2016-11-08) Davis, Simon W; Stanley, Matthew L; Moscovitch, Morris; Cabeza, Roberto