Browsing by Subject "Auctions"
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Item Open Access A Brief Review and Analysis of Spectrum Auctions in Canada(2017-05-08) MartinezCid, Ricardo; Jiao, WenfeiWe begin by explaining the importance of efficient spectrum allocation and reviewing Canada’s recent spectrum allocation history. We then use a dataset covering more than 1,200 licenses auctioned from 2001 to 2015 that seeks to account for each auction’s particular rules. Our results confirm that measures of demand such as population covered, income levels, frequency levels, bandwidth, etc. indeed drive license valuation. We also quantify the negative impact on price of setting aside particular license auctions for new entrants, suggesting that the set-aside provision constitutes an implicit subsidy for those firms.Item Open Access Auctions, Equilibria, and Budgets(2012) Bhattacharya, SayanWe design algorithms for markets consisting of multiple items, and agents with budget constraints on the maximum amount of money they can afford to spend. This problem can be considered under two broad frameworks. (a) From the standpoint of Auction Theory, the agents valuation functions over the items are private knowledge. Here, a "truthful auction" computes the subset of items received by every agent and her payment, and ensures that no agent can manipulate the scheme to her advantage by misreporting her valuation function. The question is to design a truthful auction whose outcome can be computed in polynomial time. (b) A different, but equally
important, question is to investigate if and when the market is in "equilibrium",
meaning that every item is assigned a price, every agent gets her utility-maximizing subset of items under the current prices, and every unallocated item is priced at zero.
First, we consider the setting of multiple heterogeneous items and present approximation algorithms for revenue-optimal truthful auctions. When the items are homogeneous, we give an efficient algorithm whose outcome defines a truthful and Pareto-optimal auction. Finally, we focus on the notion of "competitive equilibrium", which is a well known solution concept for market clearing. We present efficient algorithms for finding competitive equilibria in markets with budget constrained agents, and show that these equilibria outcomes have strong revenue guarantees.
Item Open Access Bidding For Parking: The Impact of University Affiliation on Predicting Bid Values in Dutch Auctions of On-Campus Parking Permits(2016-06-14) Kelly, GrantParking is often underpriced and expanding its capacity is expensive; universities need a better way of reducing congestion outside of building costly parking garages. Demand based pricing mechanisms, such as auctions, offer a possible solution to the problem by promising to reduce parking at peak times. However, faculty, students, and staff at universities have systematically different parking needs, leading to different parking valuations. In this study, I determine the impact university affiliation has on predicting bid values cast in three Dutch Auctions of on-campus parking permits sold at Chapman University in Fall 2010. Using clustering techniques crosschecked with university demographic information to detect affiliation groups, I ran a log-linear regression, finding that university affiliation had a larger effect on bid amount than on lot location and fraction of auction duration. Generally, faculty were predicted to have higher bids whereas students were predicted to have lower bids.Item Open Access The Evolution of U.S. Spectrum Values Over Time(Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (ERID) Working Paper, 2018-02-12) Connolly, Michelle P; Sá, Nelson; Zaman, Azeem; Roark, Christopher; Trivedi, Akshaya