Browsing by Subject "Development Studies"
Now showing 1 - 4 of 4
Results Per Page
Sort Options
Item Open Access Contribution of Subsidies and Participatory Governance to Fishers’ Adaptive Capacity(Journal of Environment and Development, 2016-12-01) Nenadović, M; Basurto, X; Weaver, AH© 2016, © The Author(s) 2016. The need for strengthening fishers' adaptive capacity has been proposed in the literature as an important component of effective fisheries governance arrangements in the presence of rising numbers of external drivers of change. Within the context of small-scale fisheries, government subsidies have been the main tool used for increasing adaptive capacity. We examine the relationship among adaptive capacity, subsidy programs, and fishers' participation in fisheries management, as a potentially important mediating factor affecting outcomes using a data set from two periods of a fishing community in Baja California Sur, Mexico. Our results show a correlation between those fishers with access to decision-making venues and their reception of subsidies, yet the effect of participation and subsidies on fishers' adaptive capacity is limited. This appears to be due to the authorities' lack of commitment to strengthening fishers' adaptive capacity through subsidies programs, and fishers' lack of trust in the governance processes.Item Open Access “Lies build trust”: Social capital, masculinity, and community-based resource management in a Mexican fishery(World Development, 2019-11-01) Siegelman, B; Haenn, N; Basurto, X© 2019 Elsevier Ltd This paper relates how fishermen in San Evaristo on Mexico's Baja peninsula employ fabrications to strengthen bonds of trust and navigate the complexities of common pool resource extraction. We argue this trickery complicates notions of social capital in community-based natural resource management, which emphasize communitarianism in the form of trust. Trust, defined as a mutual dependability often rooted in honesty, reliable information, or shared expectations, has long been recognized as essential to common pool resource management. Despite this, research that takes a critical approach to social capital places attention on the activities that foster social networks and their norms by arguing that social capital is a process. A critical approach illuminates San Evaristeño practices of lying and joking across social settings and contextualizes these practices within cultural values of harmony. As San Evaristeños assert somewhat paradoxically, for them “lies build trust.” Importantly, a critical approach to this case study forces consideration of gender, an overlooked topic in social capital research. San Evaristeña women are excluded from the verbal jousting through which men maintain ties supporting their primacy in fishery management. Both men's joke-telling and San Evaristeños’ aversion to conflict have implications for conservation outcomes. As a result, we use these findings to help explain local resistance to outsiders and external management strategies including land trusts, fishing cooperatives, and marine protected areas.Item Open Access Local Institutional Responses to Global Market Pressures: The Sea Cucumber Trade in Yucatán, Mexico(World Development, 2018-02-01) Bennett, A; Basurto, X© 2017 Elsevier Ltd The expansion of global seafood trade creates opportunities as well as risks for small-scale fisheries (SSFs) livelihoods. Markets provide economic opportunity, but without effective governance, high demand can drive resource degradation. In the context of small-scale sea cucumber fisheries in Yucatán, Mexico, this study documents local governance responses to new markets and identifies factors driving those responses. We conducted a comparative case study of two SSF communities, collecting participant observation and interview data during 16 months of fieldwork. Our study found that local rules-in-use did not match government regulations and that the emergence of local rules was shaped by relations of production in each study site. Specifically, patron–client relationships promoted an open access regime that expanded local fishing fleets while fishing cooperatives attempted to restrict access to local fishing grounds through collective action and multi-level linkages with government. We propose that the different material incentives arising from the way that patron–client relationships and cooperatives organize labor, capital, and profits help explain these divergent governance responses. We hypothesize that this finding is generalizable beyond the study context, especially given that patron–client relationships and cooperatives are common throughout the world's SSFs. This finding builds on previous research that indicates local institutions can mediate the effects of market pressures, showing that the emergence of local rules depends on how resource users are organized not just in relation to resource governance but vis-à-vis the markets themselves. Therefore, effective policies for SSFs facing market pressures require a greater emphasis on regulating local-level trade and governing the commercial aspects of fishing livelihoods. These lessons are relevant to the estimated 540 million individuals whose livelihoods SSFs support who may increasingly engage in the global seafood trade.Item Open Access The effect of market competition on bribery in emerging economies: An empirical analysis of Vietnamese firms(World Development, 2020-07-01) Malesky, EJ; Nguyen, TV; Bach, TN; Ho, BD© 2020 Elsevier Ltd Studies of firm bribery have not fully examined how market competition conditions the effects of social norms on firms’ bribe payments. We suggest that firms pay bribes to obtain abnormal rents and/or to conform to accepted rules of corruption. These motivations operate differently, depending on the level of market competition. Using data from an annual survey of 10,000 Vietnamese firms between 2006 and 2017, we find that in environments characterized by open competition, bribery is positively associated with long-standing norms in the business social context, while in closed-competition environments, bribe payments are functions of rents that accrue from uncertainty in policy-making.