Browsing by Subject "Fiscal policy"

How do political leaders strategically manage fiscal policy formation to enhance their political survival? What are the implications of the fiscal mechanics of survival for theories of redistribution and democratic transition? This dissertation examines the complex relationship between political regime types and fiscal information asymmetries. I focus on budgetary policies (taxation and public spending) as major strategic tools available to the executive for co-optation and punishment of opponents. I argue that allowing some degree of contestation and transparency on the fiscal contract in electoral authoritarian regimes helps the executive identify distributive claims and co-opt the opposition. Paradoxically, in new democracies, political survival depends more on lower levels of budget transparency than existent theories would have us expect. Chapters 1 and 2 present a general formal model from which I derive the major hypotheses of the study. Second, Chapters 3, 4 and 5 use new cross-national measures of fiscal transparency and test empirically the theoretical implications. The statistical models confirm the main theoretical intuitions. Finally, Chapter 6 compares in greater detail the evolution of fiscal transparency in Morocco, Turkey and Romania between 1950 and 2000. I argue that fiscal taboos closely followed the shifting political alliance and their distributional consequences for leader's survival.

This dissertation is a collection of essays with the main objective of estimate and understand macroeconomic behavior of emerging countries by the lenses of modern tools in general equilibrium modeling.

In the first chapter, I study whether structural parameters of Small Open Economy Real Business Cycle models are constant when applied to Emerging Markets data. Using data from Argentina, I estimate a small open economy model with trend shocks and working capital constraints, augmented with time varying parameters. I find that so called ``structural" parameters suffer substantial changes in the period 1983-2008. Structural instabilities arise from both technological and financial sources. Given these findings, I inquire which are the features of the data that parameter drifts capture. I review emerging markets facts and find parameter instabilities play a key role in addressing for the variability observed in the data.

In the second chapter, I study policy changes in emerging countries. Motivated by the repeated stabilization programs implemented by emerging economies during the last 30 years, I develop a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with Markov-Switching to study fiscal and monetary policies in emerging economies. I estimate the model for Mexico and find strong evidence of policy changes. Two Regimes are identified. The Active Monetary Policy Regime (AMP), in which monetary and fiscal policies respond to inflation and government debt, respectively; and the Active Fiscal Policy Regime (AFP), in which fiscal policy does not respond to government debt and monetary policy does not respond to inflation. AMP holds during short periods of time after macroeconomic crises during the 80s and 90s, and for a long period after 2002. The rest of the periods, AFP is in effect. I find that switches from AFP to AMP have strong stabilization effects at the cost of high output losses. Moreover, credibility in the persistence of the regime change is key to assess the effectiveness of the stabilization program.

This dissertation consists of two chapters studying monetary and fiscal policy. In the first chapter, I study the welfare benefits and costs of increased central bank transparency in a dynamic model of costly information acquisition where agents can either choose to gather new costly information or remember information from the past for free. Information is costly to acquire due to an agent's limited attention. Agents face an intratemporal decision on how to allocate attention across public and private signals within the period and an intertemporal decision on how to allocate attention over time. The model embeds a coordination externality into the dynamic framework which motivates agents to be overly attentive to public information and creates the possibility of costly transparency. Interestingly, allowing for intratemporal and intertempral tradeoffs for attention amplifies (attenuates) the benefits (costs) of earlier transparency whereas it attenuates (amplifies) the benefits (costs) of delayed transparency.

The second chapter, co-authored with Barbara Rossi and Atsushi Inoue, studies the empirical effects of unexpected changes in government spending and tax policy on heterogeneous agents. We use data from the Consumption Expenditure Survey (CEX) to estimate individual-level impulse responses as well as multipliers for government spending and tax policy shocks. The main empirical finding of this paper is that unexpected fiscal shocks have substantially different effects on consumers depending on their age, income levels, and education. In particular, the wealthiest individuals tend to behave according to the predictions of standard RBC models, whereas the poorest individuals tend to behave according to standard IS-LM (non-Ricardian) models, due to credit constraints. Furthermore, government spending policy shocks tend to decrease consumption inequality, whereas tax policy shocks most negatively affect the lives of the poor, more so than the rich, thus increasing consumption inequality.

This dissertation computes the optimal monetary and fiscal policy for small open and emerging economies in an estimated medium-scale model. The model departs from the conventional approach as it encompasses all the major nominal and real rigidities normally found in the literature in a single framework. After estimating the model using Bayesian techniques for one small open economy and one emerging economy, the Ramsey solution for the optimal monetary and fiscal policy is computed. Results show that foreign shocks have a strong influence in the dynamics of emerging economies, when compared to the designed optimal policy for a developed small open economy. For both economies, inflation is low, but very volatile, while taxes follow the traditional results in the literature with high taxes over labor income and low taxes for capital income.