Browsing by Subject "Intellectual History"

“Making Socialism Work: The Shchekino Method and the Drive to Modernize Soviet Industry” examines factory-level efforts to improve socioeconomic conditions in the Soviet Union during the late twentieth century. It does so to understand Soviet socialism’s capacity to evolve. Drawing on national and regional archival documents and newspapers, it contests the argument that the Soviet system was too rigid to survive in the world of computerized, post-Fordist production. By focusing on labor in the enterprise, it reveals that many of the characteristics typically associated with capitalist flexible production were present in the Soviet Union by the mid-1960s. To the extent that flexible production represents the social corollary of neoliberal political theory, “Making Socialism Work” helps to explain continuity between the Soviet and post-Soviet political economies.

This dissertation revolves around a central observation that, although the methodological differences among Greek mathematical writings are striking, these differences do not lie primarily along lines of subject matter or time period. Almost all mathematical works fall clearly into one of two distinct sets of methodological conventions, which are observable from the classical period through late antiquity, in all disciplines. Because these sets of conventions transcend time and subject, and instead seem to be followed consistently by certain authors who interact among themselves in the manner of philosophical traditions, I have interpreted them as schools of mathematical practice.

I have named the schools “systematist” and “heurist” according to the characteristic epistemological orientation of each. The systematist school, of which Euclid is the paradigmatic author, is motivated by the goal of a generalized and systematic treatment of mathematical information. Features of this method include strict conventions of presentation, the idealization of mathematical objects, a preference for universalizing propositions over unique problems, and a general reluctance to work with specific numbers, physical tools, or measurements. The heurist school, in which Archimedes, Heron of Alexandria, and Ptolemy worked, is oriented toward the discovery and development of effective methods of problem-solving. Presentation is less structured and usually more personalized, specific solutions are allowed to stand implicitly for universal principles, and physical phenomena, measurement, tools, and numerical calculations are more commonly included and addressed.

Over the course of this work I will demonstrate the existence of these two schools with a thorough survey of Greek works of theoretical mathematics; I will outline the schools’ characteristic features and histories, and show how the influences of philosophical movements and intellectual social networks affected their practices. Each of the four chapters addresses the ways in which the methods of each school were expressed in the four most common mathematical disciplines: geometry, arithmetic, astronomy, and music. The chapters will show not only the evidence for the divisions between the schools in each field, and how they developed, but also that both schools made only minor adaptations to their methodologies according to subject matter. In fact, it can be shown that even when they departed from more traditional mathematical disciplines into areas of research such as mechanics and catoptrics (i.e. fields of science and technology that use mathematical tools but are not essentially governed by mathematical principles), the epistemological and methodological differences between the systematist and heurist schools were retained.

The conclusion will show, first, that the systematist/heurist divide was fundamental and pervasive throughout the history of Greek works on mathematics and related disciplines, but that the divide was largely obscured by the activities of late antique scholars. Second, the conclusion will provide a brief sketch of how the combination of late antique transmission and modern reception of Greek mathematics have affected not only the perception of ancient mathematics (giving undue emphasis to systematist texts, despite evidence that the heurists were the larger school), but also the development of modern mathematical methods.

What accounts for the rise of defense intellectuals in the early Cold War? Why did these academics reject university life to accept positions in the foreign policy establishment? Why were so many of German origin? "The Night Watchman" answers these questions through a contextual biography of the German exile Hans Speier, a foreign policy expert who in the 1940s and 1950s consulted for the State Department and executive branch, and helped found the RAND Corporation, Stanford University's Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, and the program in international communication at MIT's Center for International Studies. In the late 1920s and early 1930s, witnessing ordinary Germans vote enthusiastically for Adolf Hitler engendered a skepticism of democracy in Speier and a cohort of social democratic intellectuals. Once Hitler assumed power in 1933, Speier and his colleagues were forced to flee Central Europe for the United States. In America, a number of these left wing exiles banded together with U.S. progressives to argue that if democracy was to survive as a viable political form in a world beset with "totalitarian" threats, intellectual experts, not ordinary people, must become the shapers of foreign policy. Only intellectuals, Speier and others argued, could ensure that the United States committed its vast resources to the defeat of totalitarianism.

World War II provided Speier and his academic cohort with the opportunity to transform their ideas into reality. Called upon by government officials who required the services of intellectuals familiar with the German language and culture, hundreds of social scientists joined the Office of War Information, Office of Strategic Services, and other new organizations of the wartime government. After the war, this first generation of defense intellectuals, uninterested in returning to the relative tranquility of academia, allied with government and military officials to create a network of state and corporate institutions that reproduced the wartime experience on a permanent basis. Speier himself became chief of RAND's Social Science Division and a consultant responsible for advising the Ford Foundation on where to direct its resources. In the latter capacity, he counseled the foundation to fund institutions that provided a home to intellectuals concerned with refining the methods of social science to improve policy-relevant knowledge.

Speier's interwar experiences with Nazism and postwar understanding of Joseph Stalin's actions in Eastern Europe and West Berlin led him to conclude that all totalitarian societies, be they fascist or communist, were run by elites who did not wish to reach détente with the United States. For this reason, Speier declared, U.S. decision-makers should treat all Soviet diplomatic overtures as feints designed to trick the western alliance into weakening its international standing. He further argued that because totalitarian states were autocracies in which the public had no say in foreign affairs, the United States should not use propaganda to win ordinary people living in the Soviet Union to its side, but should instead employ methods of psychological warfare to disrupt the personal and professional networks of Soviet elites. Speier's position at RAND and his relationship with the State Department provided him with opportunities to disseminate his opinions throughout the foreign policy establishment. By virtue of his central location in this institutional matrix, Speier influenced a number of key U.S. foreign policies, including the inflexible negotiating position adopted by U.S. delegates at the Korean War armistice talks; the tactics of U.S. psychological warfare directed against East Germany and the Soviet Union; and President Dwight D. Eisenhower's "Open Skies" proposal at the 1955 Geneva Summit.

By the 1960s, Speier had helped institutionalize both a system in which intellectuals had direct access to foreign policymakers and a policy culture that privileged expertise. His trajectory demonstrates that the Cold War national security state, broadly defined to include governmental, nongovernmental, and university-associated research centers, was not solely a proximate reaction to the perceived Soviet threat, as historians have argued, but was also the realization of a decades-old, expert-centered political vision formed in response to the collapse of the Weimar Republic.