Browsing by Subject "LAW"
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Item Open Access A microscopic model of the Stokes-Einstein relation in arbitrary dimension.(The Journal of chemical physics, 2018-06) Charbonneau, Benoit; Charbonneau, Patrick; Szamel, GrzegorzThe Stokes-Einstein relation (SER) is one of the most robust and widely employed results from the theory of liquids. Yet sizable deviations can be observed for self-solvation, which cannot be explained by the standard hydrodynamic derivation. Here, we revisit the work of Masters and Madden [J. Chem. Phys. 74, 2450-2459 (1981)], who first solved a statistical mechanics model of the SER using the projection operator formalism. By generalizing their analysis to all spatial dimensions and to partially structured solvents, we identify a potential microscopic origin of some of these deviations. We also reproduce the SER-like result from the exact dynamics of infinite-dimensional fluids.Item Open Access Nonstate Actors and Compliance with International Agreements: An Empirical Analysis of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention(International Organization, 2018) Jensen, NM; Malesky, EJ© 2017 The IO Foundation. International relations scholarship has made great progress on the study of compliance with international agreements. While persuasive, most of this work has focused on states' de jure compliance decisions, largely excluding the de facto behavior of nonstate actors whose actions the agreement hopes to constrain. Of particular interest has been whether the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention (ABC) might reduce the propensity of multinational corporations (MNCs) to bribe officials in host countries through its mechanisms of extraterritoriality and extensive peer review. Unfortunately, research is hampered by reporting bias. Since the convention raises the probability of investors' punishment for bribery in their home countries, it reduces both the incentives for bribery and willingness to admit to the activity. This generates uncertainty over which of these incentives drives any correlation between signing the convention and reductions in reported bribery. We address this problem by employing a specialized survey experiment that shields respondents and reduces reporting bias. We find that after the onset of Phase 3 in 2010, when the risk of noncompliance increased for firms subject to the OECD-ABC, those MNCs reduced their actual bribery relative to their nonsignatory competitors.