Browsing by Subject "Law and economics"

This dissertation is a collection of three chapters all pertaining to institutional economics. In short, the eld of institutional economics is an outgrowth of public economics, in the sense that in many cases he key institutions that frame economic decisionmaking are the product of public policy. However this is not exclusive. Institutional economics' key contribution is the acknowledgement that cultural and social institutions --- often developed organically over the course of centuries --- can play as signicant a role in individuals' economic choices as governmental policy. In the pages that follow, we will address the economic impact of cultural and political institutions in three contexts: Judicial decisionmaking in Islamic courts, the effects

of negative health shocks on retirement savings, and the tradeoff between retirement savings and investment in durable goods.

This dissertation comprises of three essays in law and economics. The first chapter, a joint work with my advisor - Marjorie McElroy, examines the longly debated effect of the liberalized divorce laws in the United States on the divorce rates during 1956-1989. The first and the second chapter are a theoretical and an empirical paper on a cooperative game of bribery.

This dissertation employs game theoretic techniques to examine various topics in international relations and law. Chapter 2 uses a crisis bargaining model that accounts for prior bargaining agreements to study the conditions under which states choose to engage in multiple wars over different issues. I find that a proposing state is willing to risk war with multiple states when they are overly optimistic about the state they are currently bargaining with being weak.

Chapter 3 uses a game theory model of complete information to study the conditions under which a third-party state will intervene in a civil conflict when it must account for a potential retaliation by another external state. I find that when choosing to intervene or not, the potential intervening state must weigh the costs of military action by the retaliating state and the political ramifications of issuing an empty threat against each other.

Finally, Chapter 4 uses a game theory model of asymmetric information to analyze how a criminal defendant's ability to crowdfund legal fees can impact a prosecutor's plea bargaining decision. I find that a prosecutor will offer a relatively lenient plea deal to defendants whom they perceive to have a high ability and can make the trial costs high, or who they believe are low ability defendants while facing high political costs. On the other hand, they will offer relatively harsh plea deals to defendants whom they perceive to have a high ability and the trial cost is low, or who they believe have a low ability while facing low political costs.