Browsing by Subject "Neuroeconomics"

Everyday, animals make decisions that require balancing tradeoffs like time delays, uncertainty, and physical effort demands with the prospect of rewards like food or money. The tendency to devalue rewards according to these tradeoffs is also known as discounting and depends on how much subjective value an animal places on a reward. These discounting decisions are supported by different neural systems. The influence of dopamine signaling is well-characterized as a modulator of motivation and decision making. However, the role of dopamine as a marker of interindividual differences of reward sensitivity and valuation is less clearly understood. Using a combination of neuroimaging techniques (functional magnetic resonance imaging and positron emission tomography), behavioral experiments, and meta-analyses, this dissertation identifies how trait-like variation in dopamine function explains the way people differ in their preferences and neural computations of value. Overall, the findings indicate that while dopamine may exert acute influence over reward discounting behavior, these associations may not extend to trait-like differences. Specifically, individual differences in dopamine receptor availability are related to discounting behavior in clinical populations but not healthy adults. Nevertheless, individual differences in dopamine are related to functional brain activation associated with the subjective valuation of rewards—the input to choice behavior. These results highlight that interindividual variation in dopamine is more directly linked to neural computations than observed behaviors and that dopamine-mediated psychopathology does not precisely map on to acute pharmacodynamics.

Few aspects of human cognition are more personal than the choices we make. Our decisions — from the mundane to the impossibly complex — continually shape the courses of our lives. In recent years, researchers have applied the tools of neuroscience to understand the mechanisms that underlie decision making, as part of the new discipline of decision neuroscience. A primary goal of this emerging field has been to identify the processes that underlie specific decision variables, including the value of rewards, the uncertainty associated with particular outcomes, and the consequences of social interactions. Here, across three independent studies, I focus on the neural circuitry supporting social valuation — which shapes our social interactions and interpersonal choices. In the first study (Chapter 2), I demonstrate that social valuation relies on the posterior ventromedial prefrontal cortex (pVMPFC). Extending these findings, I next show that idiosyncratic responses within pVMPFC predict individual differences in complex social decision scenarios (Chapter 3). In addition, I also demonstrate that decisions involving other people (e.g., donations to a charitable organization) produce increased activation in brain regions associated with social cognition, particularly the temporal-parietal junction (TPJ). Finally, in my last study (Chapter 4), I employ functional connectivity analyses and show that social cognition regions — including the TPJ — exhibit increased connectivity with pVMPFC during social valuation, an effect that depends upon individual differences in preferences for social stimuli. Collectively, these results demonstrate that the computation of social value relies on distributed neural circuitry, including both value regions and social cognition regions. Future research on social valuation and interpersonal choice must build upon this emerging theme by linking neural circuits and behavior.

Humans must integrate information to make decisions. This thesis is concerned with studying neural mechanisms of decision making, and combines tools from economics, psychology, and neuroscience. I employ a neuroeconomic approach to understand the processing of reward information and motivation in the brain, utilizing neural data from functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to make connections between cognitive neuroscience and economics.

Chapter 1 lays the groundwork for the thesis and provides background on neuroscience, fMRI, and neuroeconomics. Chapter 2 sketches the central challenges of using neuroscience to address economic questions. The first half of the chapter discusses familiar arguments against the integration of neuroscience and economics: behavioral sufficiency and emergent phenomenon. The second half constructs principles for interdisciplinary research linking mechanistic (neuroscience) data to behavioral (economic) phenomena: mechanistic convergence across experiments and biological plausibility in models.

Chapters 3 and 4 employ a nonstandard analysis technique, multivariate pattern analysis (MVPA), to identify brain regions that contain information associated with different types of economic valuation. Chapter 3 uses a combinatoric approach to evaluate how brain regions uniquely contribute to the ability to predict different types of valuation (probabilistic or intertemporal). MVPA shows that early valuation phases for these rewards differ in posterior parietal cortex and suggests computational topographies for different rewards. Chapter 4 employs within- and cross-participant MVPA, which rely on potentially different sources of neural variability, to identify brain regions that contain information about monetary rewards (cash) and social rewards (images of faces). Cross-participant analyses reveal systematic changes in predictive power across multiple brain regions, and individual differences in statistical discriminability in ventromedial prefrontal cortex relate to differences in reward preferences. MVPA thus facilitates mapping behavior to both individual-specific functional organization and general organization of the brain across individuals.

Chapter 5 employs a reward anticipation task to measure variation in relative motivation without observing choices between rewards (money and candy). A reaction-time index captures individual differences in motivation, and heterogeneity in this index maps onto variability in two brain regions: nucleus accumbens and anterior insula. Further, the nucleus accumbens activation mediates the predictive effects of anterior insula. These results show that idiosyncrasies in reward efficacy persist in the absence of a choice environment.

Chapters 6 and 7 conclude the thesis. Chapter 6 complements discussions of neuroeconomics with text analysis of an exhaustive corpus from top economics journals and references from a large set of review articles. The analysis shows a mismatch between topics of importance to economics and prominent concepts in neuroeconomics. I show how neuroeconomics can grow by employing cognitive neuroscience to identify biologically plausible and generalizable models of a broader class of behaviors.

Cognitive neuroscience is an interdisciplinary enterprise aimed at explaining cognition and behavior. It appears to be succeeding. What accounts for this apparent explanatory success? According to one prominent philosophical thesis, cognitive neuroscience explains by discovering and describing mechanisms. This "mechanist thesis" is open to at least two interpretations: a strong metaphysical thesis that Carl Craver and David Kaplan defend, and a weaker methodological thesis that William Bechtel defends. I argue that the metaphysical thesis is false and that the methodological thesis is too weak to account for the explanatory promise of cognitive neuroscience. My argument draws support from a representative example of research in this field, namely, the neuroscience of decision-making. The example shows that cognitive neuroscience explains in a variety of ways and that the discovery of mechanisms functions primarily as a way of marshaling evidence in support of the models of cognition that are its principle unit of explanatory significance.

The inadequacy of the mechanist program is symptomatic of an implausible but prominent view of scientific understanding. On this view, scientific understanding consists in an accurate and complete description of certain "objective" explanatory relations, that is, relations that hold independently of facts about human psychology. I trace this view to Carl Hempel's logical empiricist reconceptualization of scientific understanding, which then gets extended in Wesley Salmon's causal-mechanistic approach. I argue that the twin objectivist ideals of accuracy and completeness are neither ends we actually value nor ends we ought to value where scientific understanding is concerned.

The case against objectivism motivates psychologism about understanding, the view that understanding depends on human psychology. I propose and defend a normative psychologistic framework for investigating the nature of understanding in the mind sciences along three empirically-informed dimensions: 1) What are the ends of understanding? 2) What is the nature of the cognitive strategy that we deploy to achieve those ends; and 3) Under what conditions is our deployment of this strategy effective toward achieving those ends? To articulate and defend this view, I build on the work of Elliot Sober to develop a taxonomy of psychologisms about understanding. Epistemological psychologism, a species of naturalism, is the view that justifying claims about understanding requires appealing to what scientists actually do when they seek understanding. Metaphysical psychologism is the view that the truth-makers for claims about understanding include facts about human psychology. I defend both views against objections.