Browsing by Subject "Public goods"

Humans universally demonstrate intrinsically motivated prosocial behavior towards kin, non-kin ingroup members, and strangers. However, humans struggle to extend the same prosocial behavior to more abstract concepts like future-others and non-human species. The Adaptive Motivation Hypothesis posits that humans evolved intrinsic motivations to act prosocially towards more tangible social partners like those within an individual’s ingroup, but prosocial behavior towards more distant and abstract partners is constrained by ecological certainty. Prosocial behavior towards these more abstract concepts is more variable and more likely motivated by extrinsic reward. This dissertation aims to examine the development of motivations for prosocial behavior towards these more abstract concepts. My studies rely on common goods games as a proxy for examining behavior towards abstract recipients of prosocial behavior. Common goods are any resource like forests or fisheries that are non-excludable to a population, but rivalrous. In-demand common goods require cooperation of humans to ensure sustainable use in order to avoid depletion. Chapter One examined how children in three populations that differed in ecological certainty behaved in a common goods game where they were asked to contribute portions of their personal endowment to the maintenance of a forest. Participants were either provided a high extrinsic motivation, a low extrinsic motivation, or no extrinsic motivation for contributing to the maintenance of the common good. Results show that overall, children of all ages were more motivated to contribute to abstract recipients when extrinsic motivation is high. However, noticeable variation in behavior between populations was driven by ecological and cultural differences. Chapter Two examined whether aggregated extrinsic rewards increased contributions to common goods in a sample of children aged six to fourteen. Results suggest that both information about personal loss and delay in an acquiring resource together dramatically increase children’s contributions to common goods within both experimental and real-world contexts. Chapter Three explores whether making a typically abstract social partner more tangible increases an individual’s prosocial behavior towards said partner. Results for Chapter Three, conducted with a population in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, find that increasingly the tangibility of an abstract population marginally increases prosocial behavior in children but not in adults. Together, the results of these studies have implications improved understanding of the development of prosocial motivations in school age children, as well as applications to understanding motivations for socially conscious behavior in the face of environmental and conservation dilemmas.

Studies on the effect of regime type on public goods provision have tended to take a quantitative, cross-national approach to examining the relationship between regime type and access to public goods, and have demonstrated that democracies produce better public goods outcomes than non-democracies for a variety of theoretical reasons, including politics being more competitive in democracies, democracies needing to appease a greater proportion of their population, and re-election incentives. Such studies, however, have not aimed to understand which segments of the population receive access to benefits and the literature examining this question has tended to focus on the distribution of benefits in democracies. As such, little is known about how authoritarianism itself affects the distribution of public services.

This dissertation examines how inequalities in access to drinking water and wastewater services arise in authoritarian regimes. In examining Egypt during the period of 1882 to 2015, and using archival documents, census data, electoral returns, and interviews, I find that the groups that are prioritized for receiving access to drinking water and wastewater services differ across the different regimes within this time period, as they are a product of the goals that leaders are seeking to achieve and the structure of the authoritarian political system that is implemented, which affects elite composition, the degree of influence that leaders have over policymaking, and the regime’s relationship with the mass public.

I also find that in the aftermath of the Arab Uprisings, self-undermining policy feedbacks, which occur when those who are not benefitting from government policy that is currently in place push for significant changes in policy, can affect the state’s response to expressed discontent regarding the state of public services, but that democratization is not necessarily correlated with greater investment in public services.

Overall, the findings emphasize that political will plays an important role in affecting the distribution of public services in an authoritarian setting.

The literature on clientelism has extensively covered the direct exchange of private goods for political support between voters and politicians. Yet, patronage does not end with the distribution of food, medicine or public employment. In poor informal settlements, access to a sanitation system or clean drinking water is often mediated by local politicians.Therefore, the interaction between slum politics and the provision of Local Public Goods (LPG) is quite relevant and requires further study.

This dissertation explains the variation in infrastructure and public services in shantytowns as a function of social capital. Well-connected communities --with stronger ties among its members-- solve collective action problems, improving slum dwellers' quality of life. The linking mechanism between social capital and LPG is electoral coordination (bloc-voting). Neighbors agree for a common electoral strategy at the slum-level, which translates into an effective mechanism to demand for improvements in their locality (``good-type partisan homogeneity'').

Alternatively, isolation among slum dwellers deteriorate their access to and quality of LPG. Under the absence of social capital, when slum-level electoral behavior appears to be homogenous, it is likely signaling political clientelism and not community-led coordination. Ultimately the ``bad-type partisan homogeneity'' represents the inability of slum dwellers to enforce electoral accountability and sanction unresponsive governments. I test my hypotheses with survey data from Udaipur (India) and eight provinces in Argentina.