Browsing by Subject "Redistricting"

The ability for the citizens of a nation to determine their own representation has long been regarded as one of the most critical objectives of any electoral system. Without having the assurance of equality in representation, the fundamental nature and operation of the political system is severely undermined. Given the centuries of institutional reforms and population changes in the American system, Congressional Redistricting stands as an institution whereby this promise of effective representation can either be fulfilled or denied. The broad set of processes that encapsulate Congres- sional Redistricting have been discussed, experimented, and modified to achieve clear objectives and have long been understood to be important. Questions remain about how the dynamics which link all of these processes operate and what impact the real- ities of Congressional Redistricting hold for representation in the American system. This dissertation examines three aspects of how Congressional Redistricting in the Untied States operates in accordance with the principle of “One Person, One Vote.” By utilizing data and data analysis techniques of Geographic Information Systems (GIS), this dissertation seeks to address how Congressional Redistricting impacts the principle of one person, one vote from the standpoint of legislator accountability, redistricting institutions, and the promise of effective minority representation.

A commonly accepted model of public attitudes toward election rules assumes that citizens follow the cues of their preferred party’s elites and support rules that would benefit that party in elections. However, a separate literature on procedural fairness suggests that the public places a high priority on the fairness of democratic institutions. This dissertation tests which model predominates in the public’s decisions on election rules across a variety of policies and political contexts. It finds that most citizens prefer fair electoral institutions at the expense of partisan interest when that choice is made explicit, and a minority of committed partisans are driven by partisanship. While most partisans are unwilling to manipulate election rules to benefit their own party, they react negatively to attempts at manipulation by the other party. Citizens are susceptible to influence from elite messaging on election law issues but are resistant to attempts to influence their core democratic principles.