Browsing by Subject "U.S. foreign policy"

Now showing 1 - 3 of 3
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    Saving Institutional Benefits: Path Dependence in International Law
    (2008-04-21) Axelrod, Mark
    This project considers the pace of change in international law, focusing on sources of evolution and stagnation. I attempt to determine why negotiators defer to existing law in some situations and not others. To that end, this study explores country preferences towards the status quo in international negotiations. I hypothesize that deference to existing international law is more likely under four conditions. First, countries that have experienced a decline in relative power should promote deference to existing international law. Second, declining powers that have allowed private access by their citizens to existing international institutions should have greater domestic political pressure to protect those arrangements. Third, this relationship should be particularly strong if interested citizens are able to participate (perhaps through the ratification process) in subsequent negotiations. Finally, more complex negotiations (i.e., those including more participants) should result in greater deference to existing international law. The project tests these hypotheses with statistical analysis on a random sample of multilateral treaties, as well as case studies of negotiation practices in the United States, India, and the European Union. The analysis supports all four conjectures, and notes interactions between them.
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    Taking Another Look at Multilateral Aid Flows: Reconsidering the Dynamics of the U.S.'s Strategic Use of Development Aid
    (2011-04-25) Goodman, Jared
    Previous studies in the development aid literature have concluded that bilateral aid flows have been dominated by strategic objectives of major donors. Similar analysis of multilateral aid flows has determined that these allocations are more sensitive to economic need and quality of institutions and policy of the recipient country. A consensus has emerged that all bilateral aid is strategically driven while multilateral aid is independent of these political pressures. This paper challenges these conventional notions of the different aid types by analyzing allocation decisions from U.S. bilateral and multilateral aid agencies. It finds that strategic considerations influence both bilateral and multilateral aid. Donor influence over multilateral aid allocations requires a rethinking of how strategic aid is pursued. Improvements to the models of aid flows are offered, and a preliminary empirical analysis is attempted. It is found that the dynamics of strategic uses of aid are more complex that previous studies have concluded. The impact of these findings on the flows and efficacy of aid is discussed.
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    The Use of U.S. Diplomatic Foreign Policy for Conflict Resolution
    (2023) Dudley, Rebecca

    This dissertation examines U.S. diplomatic intervention for the purposes of conflict resolution. When are different diplomatic foreign policy tools used effectively? Understanding the effectiveness of U.S. diplomatic foreign policy in conflict resolution requires a multi-pronged approach that takes seriously the role of individual presidents, domestic political constraints and incentives, and the unique efficacy of different types of policy tools.

    The dissertation uses an empirical approach, combining original observational data sources with survey results and supplementary illustrative case studies. I present the results of a survey of academic experts on the relationship between U.S. presidents and the foreign policy bureaucracy, demonstrating the variation across different administrations in the relationship and conduct of foreign affairs. I also collect and utilize an original dataset on U.S. diplomatic involvement in peace processes (U.S.D.I.P.P. data) in large-N statistical analyses of the president’s choices . A set of original survey experiments provide insight into how the public views foreign policy choices and outcomes. Finally, a set of cross-case comparisons and a case study of George Mitchell as the U.S. Special Envoy to Northern Ireland provide evidence for the efficacy of special envoys as a diplomatic tool.

    I find that U.S. presidents’ relationship with the foreign policy bureaucracy shape their use of diplomacy for conflict resolution, and also find evidence that the president is motivated by the ability to claim credit for successes and avoid blame for failures. Results suggest that the public does differentially assign credit and blame to the president based on context. I also demonstrate the particular mechanism by which special envoys can be an effective tool of conflict diplomacy. Overall, the dissertation provides a clear picture of the relationship between the U.S. president and executive branch and the conduct of peacemaking. U.S. diplomatic intervention for the purposes of conflict resolution is shaped by the relationship between the president and the foreign policy bureaucracy as well as the president's ability to claim personal political credit and avoid blame for policy failures. This incentive structure also maps onto the specific efficacy of diplomatic foreign policy tools, such as the use of special envoys.