Browsing by Subject "feedback"

The present research investigates how motivation to affiliate with others shapes the way people search for feedback from others for their goal pursuits and its general implications on self-regulation. I hypothesize that affiliation motivation will influence how much people seek feedback from others and to whom they turn for feedback. People with high affiliation motivation will view feedback-seeking as a potential tool for strengthening their existing social ties and forming additional ones, whereas people with low affiliation motivation will perceive great costs in feedback seeking. As such, people with high affiliation motivation will seek feedback from a broad range of sources. People with low affiliation motivation, on the other hand, will seek feedback from those most willing and able to provide it, which may often be those with whom they are already close. Four studies support these predictions by showing how affiliation motivation is associated with feedback seeking from a broad range of sources (Study 1), how affiliation motivation moderates the effect of feedback source on goal performance (Studies 2 – 3), and how affiliation motivation influences goal progress indirectly through affecting the preference for feedback source in everyday goal pursuits (Study 4).

The hypercorrection effect refers to the finding that high-confidence errors are more likely to be corrected after feedback than are low-confidence errors (Butterfield & Metcalfe, 2001). In 5 experiments I examine the hypercorrection effect, offer possible explanations for why the effect occurs, and examine the durability of the effect. In Experiment 1, I replicate the hypercorrection effect and show that delaying the feedback does not reduce the effect. In a secondary item analysis I also show that the effect is not caused by "tricky" questions. In Experiments 2 and 3, I show that subjects are more likely to remember the source of the feedback after both high-confidence errors and low-confidence correct responses. This suggests that it is the discrepancy between the subject's expectation and the actual feedback that causes the hypercorrection effect. In Experiment 4 I show that the hypercorrection effect also occurs for episodic false memories showing the diversity of the effect. Finally, in Experiment 5 I examine the durability of the effect. Initial high-confidence errors that are corrected after feedback remain corrected one week later.